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1 • INTRODUCTION
In recent y ear s theor e t i c a l  e conomist s have begun to examine 
the e f f e c t s  of imperfect  informa t i on on the e x i s tenc e ,  uniquene s s ,  and 
e f f i c iency o f  market equ i l ibria , both in labor market s  [ 40 ,  Mort en s en , 
1 9 7 6 ; 6 9 , Wilde , 1 9 7 7 ] and in consumer pro duct marke t s  [ 7 ,  But t er s ,  
1 9 7 7 ; 5 1 , Salop and S t ig l i t z , 1 9 7 7 ; 7 0 , Wilde and S chwart z ,  1 9 7 7 ] . Two 
s ig n i f icant conc l u s i ons  can be drawn from this  l iterature : ( 1 )  the 
proper t ie s  o f  market  equil ibr ia are extr eme ly sen s i t iv e  to  the search 
s trateg i e s  used  by consumer s or worker s ,  and ( 2 )  the key to 
" s tab i l i z ing " market s  at  pr ice  or wage d i st r ibut ions which are 
compet i t ive in an appropr iate s en s e  is direct compar i s on shopp ing . 
W i th direct  compari son shopp ing , consumer s ,  for examp l e ,  actua l ly 
compare brands to each o ther and choo se the b e s t  from tho se that they 
have seen .I 
Economist s commonly a s sume that consumers search by def ining a 
hypothe t i c a l  r e s erva t ion ( or cut o f f )  l ev e l  against which brands  or j obs 
are compared s equent ia l ly . Economic theory , however , i s  not ( o r ,  at 
l ea s t , ha s not been) very useful  in i d ent ify ing which s earch s tra teg i e s  
a r e  appropriate to spe c i f i c  informat iona l s e t t ings . Moreover , s ince 
consumer s and worker s  who face po s i t ive inf ormat ion acqui s i t ion co s t s  
a r e  l ike ly to  choose a "sat i s fa c t ory" al terna t ive rather than an 
"opt ima l "  one [ 35 ,  March and S imon , 1 95 8 ] , the i s sue of  which search 
s trategies  people  should use may on ly be r e s o lvab l e  emp i r i ca l ly .  
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Thi s  paper concentrat e s  on consumer produc t markets  as oppo sed  
t o  labor  marke t s . Thi s is  pr imar i ly becau s e  the r e l evant nonec onomic 
l i terature is domina t e d  by p sycho l o g i s t s and marke t ing s p e c ia l i st s . 2 
Further , consumer inf orma t ion acqui s i t ion probl ems are curr ent ly 
attract ing mor e a t t ent ion than the informat ion a cqui s i t ion problems of 
workers because there ha s been more  leg i s la t ive and regu l a t ory 
intervent ion in consumer pr·odu c t  and f inanc ia l market s  than l abor 
market s .  For exampl e ,  Day [ 1 0 ,  1 9 7 6 ]  l i s t s  nine t e en inf orma t ion 
d i s c l osure requiremen t s  r e l a t e d  t o  consumer product and f inan c ia l  
marke t s  impl emented between 1 9 7 0  and 1 9 7 6 , and another twenty-nine 
which he c a l led "probabl e  for the futur e "  ( ser ious propo sa l s  under 
consideration ) . Moreover , h i s  tabula t ion is i l lustra t ive , not 
comprehens iv e . Given the profound impact o f  some o f  th i s  legi s l a t ion,  
it  is  cruc ial that  we b e t t er understand the  pro c e s s  o f  informat ion 
acqu i s i t ion and its imp l icat ions f or market structure . 
Thi s paper w i l l  a l so concentra te on the proce s s  o f  inf ormat ion 
acqu i s i t ion ; it's pr imary purpo s e  i s  to  review exper imen t a l  and 
emp ir i c a l  evidence r e l a t e d  to ind ividual consumer behavior under 
imperf e c t  informa t i on .  Thus I won't say much about market structure . 
Mainstream e conomi c s ,  of cour s e ,  ha s a lway s  focused on market out come s 
a s  oppo s e d  t o  indiv i dua l dec i s ion rul e s , the empha s i s  be ing o n  
in s t i tut ion s  ra ther than peopl e . 3 But t h e  l i terature ha s now r eached a 
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point where s ome detailed a t t ention mu st be paid to the lat ter . 
Mo st of the nontheore t ical work reviewed in th i s  pape r  dea l s  
w i t h  survey data or exper iment s .  B o t h  o f  the se sour c e s  have we l l-known 
short coming s which I wil l not d i scus s in detai l .4 My intent i s  to
intro duce e conomi s t s ,  psycho l og i s t s  and c on sumer r e s ear cher s to  
l i t eratur e s  whi ch may be new t o  many . The paper i s  organ i z e d  as 
fo l l ows . In the next s e c t ion an overview o f  the c onsumer's inf ormat ion 
acqu i s i t ion pro b l em is pre sent e d .  I n  S e c t ion 3 formal mode l s  o f  
inf o rmat ion acqu i s i t ion,  pr imar i ly as  deve l oped b y  economi st s ,  are then 
reviewed . In S e c t ion 4 eviden c e  r e l evant to the se formal mod e l s  i s  
pre s ented . S e c t ions 5 and 6 are focused o n  two spec ial topic s ,  
" sat i s factory search" and " information over l oad . "  I n  a f inal s e c t ion 
d i r e c t ions f or future r e s ear ch are sugge s t e d . 
Two genera l i zat ions emerge from the d i sc u s s ion which fol lows . 
F ir s t ,  it appear s that many consumer s do l i t t l e  shopp ing . For exampl e ,  
the survey s d i scus s e d  i n  Sect ion 4 typ ical ly f ind that 40 t o  6 0  percent 
o f  the r e s pondents  vi s it on ly one s t ore prior t o  purchas ing a goo d ,
regar d l e s s  of  whe ther it  i s  durab l e  o r  nondurab l e . What th i s  imp l i e s  
i s  n o t  c l ear . Cer tain ly it i s  n o t  altoge ther surpr i s ing , g iven the 
large number o f  pur chase dec i sions the average consumer must make each 
day , but whe ther o b s erved l eve l s  of  s ear ch are soc ia l ly opt imal is an 
unreso lved issue .S Second , even though mo st consumers  do relativ e l y
l i t t l e  shopp ing , they are sens i t ive t o  t h e  c o s t s  and bene f i t s  of  
search . Henc e ,  wh ile the  spe c ific models of  consumer behavior under 
imperfect  inf ormat ion propo sed by e conomi s t s  may not alway s be 
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appropriate ,  the under ly ing me thodology seems extreme ly u s e fu l . 
2 .  AN OVERVIEW OF THE CONSUMER' S INFORMATION ACQUISITION PROBLEM 
In i t s  mo st g eneral f ormulation the consumer ' s  prob l em is qu i t e  
comp l ex .  I t  inc ludes dec iding when to s ear ch and wher e , how to c o l lect  
informat ion,  how t o  proc e s s  it , how to compare d i f f er ent alt ernat ive s ,  
and when t o  s t op searching . S everal me thods for deal ing with the se 
pro b l ems are availab l e  to consumer s .  Fo llowing Hir schle ifer [ 25 ,  
1 9 7 3 ] , i t  i s  u s e fu l  t o  d i s t ingu i sh two general c las s e s . The f ir s t  
invo lv e s  an ac t ive adaptat ion t o  uncertainty in which the c onsumer 
e i ther produc e s  information by direct  search or buy s  information from 
marke t  s our c e s  ( c on sumer magaz ine s ,  emp loyment servic e s ,  want-ads , 
et c ) .  The se cond c las s involves a mor e pas s iv e  adaptation to  
unc ertainty in which the  consumer mon i t o r s  and evaluate s inf ormat ion 
exogenou s ly d i s s eminated  by f i rms  or o ther consume r s . The se 
d i s t inct ions empha s i z e  that inf ormat ion acqui s i t ion i s  a more general 
pro c e s s than informat ion search,  a po int made by Bet tman [ 3 ,  1 9 7 7 ] . 
B e t tman al so draws a distinc tion between internal sear ch and r e tr ieval 
( informat ion sought from memory) and external search ( information 
sought from outs ide sour c e s ) .  He de scribes  the consumer' s s ear ch 
proce s s  as f o l lows : 
It is propo sed  that informa t ion sear ch general ly begins with 
int erna l search , with memory explored for relevant informa t i on .  
A s  the consumer exam ine s information in memory ,  that informat ion 
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may prove to be suffic i ent for the purpo s e s  at hand , and no 
further search may be undertaken . However , that informat ion may 
not be suff i c i ent . S everal p i e c e s  o f  inf ormation may conf l i c t , 
information may be lacking , and so f orth . [ A ] lthough the 
consumer s' re sponse s to  such conf l i c t s  or lack o f  inf ormation w i l l  
vary , one maj or type of  response to insuf f ic ient information o r  
con f l i c t ing inf ormat ion i s  ext ernal search .l6 1
During externa l  sear c h ,  t h e  consumer examine s t h e  environment 
to  see if  r e l evant inf ormation is avai lab l e . The consumer in 
general uses d i f fer ent detai l e d  s earch pat t erns and searche s for 
differ ent amount s  o f  inf orma t i on in d i f f er ent cho i c e  s i tuat ions . 
Information acquired dur ing ext ernal search wil l lead to further 
internal s ear ch to  interpr et  or elaborate that informat ion . Thu s , 
there i s  a cont inual cyc l ing between int erna l  and externa l  search 
proc e s s e s . Eventua l l y ,  o f  cour s e ,  the consumer w i l l  cea s e  
sear ch ing f or information and make a cho i c e . [ 3 ,  1 9 7 7 , pp . 2-3 ] . 
The pa s s ive mode of inf ormat ion acqu i s i t ion , monitoring and 
evaluat ing exogenou s ly d i s s emina t e d  information,  forms a backdrop to  
the  ac t ive mode de scr ibe d above; there i s  a cont inuous l earning proce s s  
that creat e s  a s t o ck o f  informat ion which i s  avai lab l e  to the consumer 
for int ernal s ear ch and re trieval .  If the consumer is ab l e  to dec ide 
so l e ly on the bas i s  o f  the stock of  s t ored information,  then ext erna l 
s earch i s  irr e l evant . But (as far as I know) no one has studied this  
aspect  o f  de c i s ionmaking . Hence th i s  survey wi l l  concentrat e on the 
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ext ernal component o f  inf ormat ion s earch . 
3 .  FORMAL MODELS OF EXTERNAL SEARCH BEHAVIOR 
The fundamental art i c l e  in the e conomi c s  l i terature on consumer 
informat ion acqu i s i t ion i s  S t ig l er's "The Economics  of Inf ormat ion" 
[ 60 ,  1 9 6 1 ] . S t ig l er's theory o f  consumer b ehavior under imperfe c t  
information advanced the propo s i t ion that an ind iv i dual would invest  in 
informat ion unt i l  the marg i nal co st of further inv e s tment is greater 
than or equal to  the marg ina l gain ( in t erms o f  lower exp e c t e d  pur chas e 
price ) . Thi s  pr emi s e ,  unsurpri s ing ly,  set  the tone for mo st o f  the 
subs equent work by e co nomi st s s ince it i s  a natural ext en s ion of 
conventional ful l-inf ormat ion consumer theory . 
S t i g l er cons idered an impe r f e c t ly informed consumer face d  with 
po s i t ive inf ormation acqui s i t ion c o s t s  and intere s t e d  in pur chas ing one 
un i t  o f  a homogeneous good . S ince the consumer was as sumed only to  
have some general not ion o f  pric e s ,  S t ig l er a l s o  as sume d the  cho i c e  
method woul d  b e  to s e t  a f ixed number of  s t or e s  to  v i s i t  ( a  prior i) and 
then buy from the s t ore  charg ing the lowe st price  of tho se samp l e d . 
The opt imal number o f  stores to v i s i t  i s  det ermine d  by a s imp l e  co st­
bene f i t  calculat ion . 
S t i g l er's theory , based on the f ixed samp l e  s i z e  rul e ,  has been 
c r i t i c ized  by e conomi s t s  on two grounds . McCa l l  [36 , 1 9 6 5; 3 7 ,  1 9 7 0] 
argue d that the best  sear ch strategy i s  a sequent ial rul e in wh ich , 
af t er vi s i t ing any st ore , a dec i s ion i s  made whe ther or not to sear ch 
further ,  and Roth schild  [ 48 ,  1 9 7 3 ] c r i t i c i z e d  both St i g l er and McCal l 
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for ana lyz ing on ly one s ide o f  the market . 7 That i s ,  he c r i t i c ized
them for taking wage or price  d i sper s ion a s  g iven and s imp ly ana l y z ing 
worker or consumer b ehavior , thus argu ing , once again ,  f or a focus  on 
market s  as oppo s e d  to individua l s .  
Whil e  Roth schild's comment s  inspired a number o f  a t t empt s  t o  
" c l o s e "  the s ear ch mod e l  b y  exp l i c it ly incorporat ing f i rms , the 
r e s u l t ing work has u l t imat e ly led back to the actual s e arch s t r a t e g i e s  
u s e d  by consumers; e s ta b l i shing t h e  exi s t ence o f  per s i st ent price  
d i sper s ion ( in equil ibr ium) turns out  to  be extr eme ly sen s i t ive to  the  
way consumer inf orma t ion a cqui s i t ion i s  mode l e d . 
It now appear s tha t while the s equent ia l rul e is opt ima l � 
s tr a t egy when consumers know the true di s tribution of price s ,  it might 
not be opt ima l under l e s s  r e s t r i c t ive a s sumpt ions regard ing consumer 
expe c tat ions . For examp l e ,  Ga stwirth [ 1 7 ,  1 9 7 6 ] ha s shown if the 
consumer's e s t imat e  of  the d i s t r ibut ion o f  pr i c e s  is ina c cura t e , a 
s equent ia l rule could l ea d  to a s ignif icant over inve stment in 
inf orma t ion . Henc e the opt ima l samp l e  s i z e  rul e may domina t e  the 
s equent ia l rule in such a case [ 48, Rothschild, 1 9 7 3 ] . 8 
P sycho l og i s t s  have u s e d  exp e r imen t s  to st udy bo th f ixed sampl e  
s iz e  rul e s  [ 1 9 ,  Green, Ha lbert, and Mina s ,  1 96 4 ]  and s equent ial rul e s  
[ 45,  Pitz, 1 96 8 ] . 9 In a n  e s p e c ia l ly int erest ing exper iment , Fr ied and
P e t er son [ 1 5,  1 96 9 ]  direct ly compare d the two . In the se experiment s  
subj e c t s  faced a pane l con s i st ing o f  two co lumns , each containing 24 
pair s of red and g reen bulb s with a but t on b e tween each pair . Pushing 
the but ton caus e d  one member of the pa i r  to l ight . Which bu lb l i t  up 
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wa s d e t e rmine d  randomly according to some f ixed probab i l i t y . Subj e c t s  
were not t o l d  t h e  true proba b i l i t y  but rather that it  w a s  one o f  two 
va lue s . The subj e c t s' t a sk was  to determine which one , ba sed on their 
observat ions . 
Two var iat ions of th i s  des ign were used  by Fr ied and P e t e r s on; 
in the f ir st the proportion o f  r e d  to green l ight s wa s e i ther 7 0:3 0 or 
3 0:70 and in the s e cond the proportion was e i ther 60:40 or 40:60 . In 
the f ir st d e s ign subj e c t s  earned $ . 3 0  for a correct dec i s ion and were 
f ine d $1 . 7 0  for an incorrect  d e c i s ion . In the second des ign the s e  
va lues  t ook on $ .SO a n d  $1 . 5 0  r e s p e c t ive ly . In e i ther c a s e  t h e  c o s t  of  
observing any pair o f  bu lbs was $0 . 0 1 . With in ea ch tr eatment 
s equent ia l and fixed samp l e  s iz e  rul e s  were used on al terna t ive trial s .  
In the former the subj e c t s  could observe l ight bu lb pa i r s  one-at-a-t ime 
and make a de c i s ion whenever they l ike d . In the l a t t er they ha d t o  
spec ify a f ixed number o f  light bu lb pa i r s  to observe at t h e  s t a r t  of  
the trial  and then make a dec i s ion ba sed  on ly on the  out come o f  tho s e  
observat i on s . 
The r e s u l t s  of the Fr ied and Peter son experiment are s omewhat 
sur p r i s ing . As one might expe c t ,  average earning s under the sequent ial 
rule wer e greater than average earnings under the f ixed samp l e  s i z e  
rul e . But performance under the f ixed samp l e  s iz e  r u l e  more c l o s e ly 
approxima t e d  opt ima l performance than performance under the sequen t i a l  
rul e . In par t i cular, in t h e  f i r s t  des ign, a r i sk neu tral subj e c t  could 
exp e c t  to earn $3 . 6 0  u s ing the opt ima l sequen t ia l  ru l e  a s  compared to 
$1 . 00 us ing the o p t ima l f ixed samp l e  s iz e  rul e .  Mean actual  earning s 
were $2 . 6 0  us ing s equent ial rul e s  and $1 . 06 us ing f ixe d sample s iz e  
ru l e s . In the s e cond des ign the opt ima l s e quent ia l rul e  woul d  have 
y i e l d e d  expe c t e d  earning s of  $3 . 3 8  and the opt ima l f ixed samp l e  s iz e  
rul e wou l d  y i e l d  expe c t e d  e arnings o f  -$2 . 6 0 . Mean actua l  earnings 
were $ . 3 7  and -$1 . 85 r e s pe c t ive ly . 
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Whi l e  the theor e t i c a l  work o f  Gastwirth and the experiment s  of  
Fried  and P e t er son sugg e st that  i t  may s ome t ime s be inappropr ia t e  to 
a s sume that consume r s  use  pure se quen t i a l  search rule s ,  both sequen t ia l  
and f ixed samp l e  s iz e  rul e s  share s evera l important featur e s . The s e  
inc lude predict ions t h a t  t h e  amount o f  informa t ion acquired i s  
inver s e ly r e l a t e d  t o  i t s  c o s t, a n d  t h a t  a s  p r i c e s  become more d i sper se 
the expe cted  tota l c o s t  o f  pur cha se decrease s [ 49 ,  Ro th s c h il d ,  1 9 7 4 ] . 
The more f undamental o f  the s e  two pre d i c t ions i s  that the 
amount o f  informa t ion acquired is inver se ly r e l a t e d  t o  its c o s t . 
However, thi s r e su l t  i s  o f t en l e s s  u s eful in app l icat ion than o ne might 
expe c t . Con s i der, for examp l e ,  the e f fe c t  o f  e ducat ion on externa l 
s e ar ch .  Some author s have pre d i c t e d  a po s i t ive r e l a t ionship between 
the two s ince educat ion "repr e sents  ab i l ity and int erest  in se eking and 
eva luat ing inf o rmat ion" [ 44 ,  Newman and S t a e l in, 1 9 7 2 ,  p .  25 2 ] ;  tha t 
i s, they argue tha t e ducat ion i s  inver s e ly r e l a t e d  to d irect  search 
cost s for  two rea sons: ( 1 )  e duca ted  consumer s are more e f f i c i ent 
shop p e r s, and ( 2 )  e ducated consumer s  may enj oy the informa t ion 
acqui s i t ion pro c e s s . The se argument s may or may not be true, but, in 
any event, ind irect  search c o s t s  mus t  a l so be taken into cons iderat ion; 
one could a l so argue that an educa ted consumer w i l l  have high opportunity 
10  
co s t s  a s so c iated  with t ime spent shopping if  educat ion increa s e s  the 
va lue o f  lei sure time . Thus e ducat ion may reduce ext erna l se arch . The 
point of the s e  argument s is tha t  the theor e t i c a l  r e l a t ionship between 
educat ion and ext erna l search i s  ambiguous even i f  the e f f e c t  of  
increased  search co s t s  i s  a lway s to  decrea s e  externa l  search . 
Similar problems arise  with respect  t o  the ef fect  of income on 
ext erna l  sear c h .  Consumer s with high income s can afford more search 
than consumer s with low income s ,  but they also have higher opportunity 
co s t s  a s so c ia ted with t ime spent shopp ing . Hence, a s  in the  c a s e  o f  
educa t ion , a negat ive theor e t i c a l  r e l a t ionship between search c o s t s and 
ext erna l s earch doe s  l i t t l e  t o help pre d i c t  the r e l a t ionship between 
income and ext erna l search . 
4 .  EVIDENCE RES PECTING EXTERNAL SEARCH 
The pr inc ipa l  a s pe c t s  of externa l search are direct ion and 
intens ity . Dire c t ion refers  to the sour c e s  of inf orma t ion used by 
consume r s  and int e n s i t y  r e f e r s  to the l eve l of inve s tment in search . 
S ince d i f f er ent sour c e s  of inf orma t ion have d i f f erent co s t s, the 
d i s t inc t ion between direct ion and int en s ity i s  not a lway s c l ear . 
Neverthe l e s s ,  consumer r e s ear cher s have tra d i t io na l ly drawn j u st such a 
d i s t inc t i on and i t  has begun recent ly to be recognized by economi st s as  
we l l  [ e . g . , 52 ,  Satter thwai t e, 1 9 7 7 ] . Exampl e s  of  pot ent ial sour c e s  of  
informa t i on inc lude shopp ing a t  s t or e s ,  conver s a t ions with sale spersons 
or f r i ends, adve r t i s ement s, and con sumer magazine s . An addit ional 
sour c e  o f  informat ion is direct consumpt ion o f  goods . Th i s  f orm of 
1 1  
inf o rmat ion acqui s i t ion has been labe l e d  exp e r i ence b y  Ne l s on [ 41 ,  
1 9 7 0 ] , who was the first  cont emporary e conomist t o  recogniz e  it s 
impor tance .  Exper ience can be useful  when the var iance in unobservab l e  
qua l i tat iv e  charac t e r i st i c s  i s  h igh r e lat iv e  to t h e  var ianc e  i n  
obs ervabl e  charac teri s t i c s  s u c h  as p r i c e . I t  i s  a l s o  l ike ly t o  b e
u s e f u l  for l ow co st produc t s . A n  ear ly c la s s ificat ion o f  g o o d s  s imilar 
to Nel son' s was made by Cope land [ 9 ,  1 9 23 ] . He d ivided g oo d s  into 
three  c lasse s : shopping goods , conven ien c e  goods , and spe c ia l ty goods . 
Shopp ing goods corr e s pond to s ear ch goods  wh i l e  convenience goods  and 
spe c ia l ty goods correspond roughly t o  exper ience goods , 1 0  
S ome work , e s p e c ia l ly survey r e s ear ch, has cons idered the 
direct ion o f  ext erna l  sear ch , Katona and Mue l l er [ 3 1 , 1 95 5 ] providing 
an ear ly examp l e . The study which mo st exp l i c i t ly f o c u s e s  on direct ion 
is Ude l l  [ 6 8 ,  1 96 6 ] . Ude l l  concentrated  his survey o f  shopp ing 
behavior on the type s o f  inf ormat ion consume r s  seek and the sour c e s  of 
information they u t i l i z e  in shopp ing f or sma l l  app l ianc e s , conc luding 
that "the typ ical consumer doe s  not go from s t or e  t o  store to gather 
informat ion and t o  compare produ c t s  and pr i c e s  when shopp ing for smal l 
e l e c trical app l ianc e s . He or sije prefers  to do much of thi s s ear c hing 
and shopp ing in the comfort of the home by u s ing out-of-store sour c e s  
o f  inf ormat i on, e spec ial ly pa st exper ience with produc t s  and brand s ,
d i s c u s s ions with friends , and pr int e d  med ia advert i s ing . "  Furthermor e ,  
" [ a]lmo st two-thir ds ( 6 5 % )  o f  the pur chasers b e l ieved that they had 
suf f i c ient information and were ready to buy when they made the ir f ir s t  
v i s i t  t o  a retail s t ore"  [ 6 8 ,  1 96 6 , p .  5 2 ] . 
1 2  
I n  a more recent study , C laxton,  Fry , and Port i s  [ 8 ,  1 9 7 4 ]  
examine d t h e  prepur chase search behavior of furniture and app l iance 
buyer s ,  concentra t ing on the t o tal number of sour c e s  u s e d ,  numb er of 
s t o r e s  v i s i t e d ,  and t o ta l  d e l iberat ion t ime . Thi s study i s  somewhat 
unique in i t s  empha s i s  on the "mu l t i-d imens ional prof ile  of s ear ch 
ac t iv i t y "  [ 3 ,  Bet tman , 1 97 7 , p .  1 9 ] ; in other wor ds ,  it  considers  both 
the dire c t ion o f  s earch and the intensity o f  search . O ther studie s ,  
such as Katona and Mue l ler [ 3 1 , 1 95 5 ]  or Newman and S tae l in [ 44 ,  1 97 1 ] 
t end to focus  on aggregate measur e s  o f  informat ion search ( see al so 
Eng l e ,  Kol lat , and Backwe l l ' s  d i s c u s s ion of ext erna l search [ 13 ,  1 9 7 3 ]  
o r  Newman and Lo ckeman' s  crit ique o f  measur e s  o f  informat ion sear ch
[ 43 ,  1 97 7 ] ) .
The C laxto n ,  Fry and Por t i s  survey ident i f ied  three subgroups 
o f  buyer s .  The f i r s t ,  " thorough/ s t ore-intense " (5 percent o f  the
furni ture buyer s and 8 percent o f  the appl iance  buyer s )  v i s i t e d  a very 
large  number o f  s t ore s ,  used many sour c e s ,  and took a l ong t ime to 
decide . The s e cond , "thorough / balanced"  ( 44 percent o f  the furniture 
buyer s and 2 7  p er c ent o f  the app l iance buyer s ) , v i s i t e d  fewer s t or e s , 
s t i l l used  several source s ,  and took a moderate amount of t ime to 
decide . The f i nal subgroup , "nonthorough" ( 34 p er c ent o f  the furniture 
buy er s and 6 5  percent of the app l ianc e  buyer s ) ,  made few s t or e  vi s i t s 
( one or two ) , used  on ly about one sour c e ,  and d e l iberated l i t t l e . 
Regarding the d i s t inct ion between direct ion of search and 
int en s i t y ,  the inter e s t ing compari son in thi s study is between the 
thorough/ s tore-inten s e  and the thorough/ balanced subgroup s f or 
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app l iance buyers . The f o rmer u s e d  f ewer sour c e s  o f  inf ormation and 
made more store v i s i t s than the lat t er ; that i s ,  there  may be a trade­
o f f  between dire c t ion ( in thi s case in- s tore sour c e s  of informat ion) 
and inten s i ty -- consumer s who use  f ewer sour c e s  o f  informat ion may use 
them more int en s e ly .  I f  d i f f er ent sour c e s  o f  informat ion are 
approximate ly equal in t erms o f  cont ent , th i s  mean s that t o tal 
informat ion acqu i s i t ion may be independent ( rough ly speaking ) o f  the 
sour c e / int ens ity mix . Under the s e  c ircumstance s ,  the e conomic approach 
to inf ormation acqui s i t ion ( which ignor e s , f or the mo s t  part , the 
d i s t inc t ion between the two ) might s t i l l  yie ld  u s e ful pr edict ions . 
Whe ther thi s i s  true , however , i s  an open que s t ion s ince the pre c i s e  
nature o f  the sour c e / int en s ity trade - o f f  has n o t  been studied further ,  
e i ther theor e t i ca l ly o r  emp ir i c a l ly . 
Exist ing work provides  l i t t l e  he lp  in the effor t  to unravel  
the s e  e f fe c t s  s ince it  provide s f ew c lues  as  t o  what sort of search 
strate g i e s  consumer s  commonly use . For  examp l e ,  many o f  the  buyers  in  
Ude l l ' s study o f  sma l l  app l iance pur cha s e s  might have u s e d  sequent ial 
strat e g i e s . He found "a shopper is no t l ike ly to examine a smal l 
appl ianc e ,  l eave the store wi thout buying i t ,  and return at a later 
t ime to make the purchase [ 6 8 ,  1 96 6 , p .  5 2 ] . But Ude l l  did not s tudy 
the amount of in- s t ore  compar i son shopp ing . S imilar problems p lague 
other studie s .  Whi l e  data i s  availabl e  on number of store  v i s i t s  [ 4 ,  
Bruce and Dollllllermuth , 1 96 8; 6 ,  Buck l in ,  1 96 6; 1 1 , Dollllllermuth,  1 96 5; 1 2 , 
Dommermuth and Cundif f ,  196 7 ;  31 , Kat ona and Mue l ler , 1 95 5 ;  44 , Newman 
and S tae l i n ,  1 9 7 2; 6 8 ,  Ude l l ,  1 96 6 ] , number of shopp ing trips  prior to 
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pur chase [ 6 ,  Bucklin , 1 96 6 ] , number of prepurcha s e  v i s i t s  to the store 
o f  purchase [ 6 8 ,  Ude l l ,  1 96 6 ] ,  and number o f  brands examine d [ 1 1 ,
Dommermuth , 1 96 5 ] , no s y s t emat i c  survey is  comp l e t e  enough to support 
p laus ible  inferen c e s  regarding s earch strateg i e s . 
The stud i e s  ju st d i s cu s sed considered both the int ens i ty o f  
s earch and the direct ion . In general the inten s ity o f  ext erna l  sear ch 
i s  a f unct ion o f  i t s  per c e ived c o s t s  and bene f i t s . An Eng l e ,  Ko l lat , 
and B lackwel l  put i t ,  "whe ther externa l  search o ccur s as we l l  as the 
extent t o  which it oc cur s appear to depend on the consumer ' s  p e r c e p t ion 
of the value o f  the resul t s  o f  search and the c o s t s  involved in
engag ing in s ear ch "  [ 14 ,  1 9 73 , p .  3 7 6 ] . Thi s  is in accord wi th the 
e conomi st s '  view as  out l ine d in Sect ion 3 .  The maj or dif ference i s  
that p sycho l og i s t s  take into account a great er variety o f  gains and 
co s t s  a s s o c iated  with externa l  search than do economi st s .  
The value o f  external s ear ch depends , in the p sycholog i s t s '  
view , o n  the amount and appropr iat ene s s  of  stored  informat ion , and the 
per c e ived r i sk o f  the pur cha se de c i s ion . P er c e ived risk encompa s s e s  
uncertaint i e s  a s s o c iated  w ith "the u s e  of the product and the s o c ia l  
con sequence s  inherent in us ing i t "  as  we ll  as t h e  mone tary consequenc e s  
[ 23 ,  Hansen,  1 9 7 2 ,  p .  8 9 ] . Thus i t  i s  af f e c t e d  b y  f inanc ial r i sk 
( invo lving both price  and the expe cted  l i f e t ime of the good ) , and o ther 
s o c ial-p sycho logical r i sk factor s [ 14 ,  Eng l e ,  Ko l lat , and B lackwe l l ,  
1 9 73 , pp . 376-82 ] . Add i t ional p sychological bene f i t s  might include 
increase d  sat i s fact ion with the purchase or f e e l ing that one did a 
thorough j ob [ 3 ,  Bettman , 1 9 7 7 , p .  2 0 ] . The p sycholog i s t s '  mo d e l  
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pre d i c t s  that a high degree o f  per c e ived r i sk i s  a s s o c iated w i th more 
externa l  search . This prediction,  along with a mor e general d i scus s ion 
of p er c e ived r i s k ,  can be found in Bauer [ l ,  1 9 6 0 ] . Bauer argue s that 
consumers  often u s e  other t e chnique s f or reduc ing perceiv e d  r i sk 
b e s i d e s  ext ernal s earch . The s e  inc l ude dev e l o p ing brand l oyal t y ,  us ing 
adver t i s ing , or fol lowing op inion l eader s .  Nel son [ 41 ,  1 97 0] 
d i s cu s se s ,  to some ext ent , the e conomi c incen t iv e s  for u s ing the se 
var ious t e chnique s .  
The pr e d i c t ion that per c e iv e d  r i sk i s  po s i t ively r e lated t o  
ext ernal s ear ch i s  con s i s t ent w i th p r e d i c t ions o f  economi c mod e l s  that 
gr eat er price  d i sp e r s ion [ 49 ,  Ro th s c h il d ,  1 9 7 4 ]  and greater durab i l ity 
[ 7 1 ,  Wilde , 1 9 7 7 ]  imp ly more s ear ch .  However , becaus e  s earch increa s e s  
w i t h  perceived  r isk, the psycho l og i st s '  mod e l  al so predi c t s  that higher 
pr i c e s  imp ly more sear ch ; e conomi c mode l s ,  by contra s t , consider p r i c e  
al one to be irre levant . The mode l s  d i scus s e d  in Sect ion 3 typical ly 
ana lyz e the b ehavior of a consumer intere s t e d  in purchas ing a s ingl e  
un i t  of some good , act ing so a s  t o  minimiz e  the exp e c t e d  t o tal c o s t  of 
pur chase ( f inal price plus  s ear ch co st s ) . In thi s case a s impl e  shift  
in the d i stribut ion o f  p r i c e s  may change some o f  the parame t e r s  which 
d e f i ne an opt imal s trategy ( f or examp l e ,  the r e s e rvation price  
a s s o c iated with a se quent ia l rule ) ,  but  i t  w i l l not change the  exp e c t e d  
amount of sear c h .  The scanty evidence availab l e  in t h e  economi c s  
l i terature weakly suppor t s  the p sycho log i st s '  po s i t ion o n  th i s  i s sue . 
Pratt,  Wi se, and Ze ckhau ser [ 48, 1 9 7 9 ] ,  f or examp l e, sample  p r i c e s  o f  
5 0  produ c t s  b y  s e l ect ing page s  a t  random from the Bos t on t e l ephone 
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d i r e c tory . E l iminat ing pro du c t s  for  which the c o l l e c t ion of price  
inf ormat ion was d i f f icul t ,  39  categor i e s  r emaine d .  For  the s e  the  
author s found a " large po s i t ive r e lat ionship between standard deviation 
and mean pr i c e . " 1 1  Further ev i dence from the none conomics l i t erature
which suppor t s  the psycholog i s t s '  pre d i c t ion o f  a po s i t ive r e lat ionship 
between pr ice  and externa l search i s  d i scus s e d  later in th i s  s e c t i o n .  
Regar ding co s t s  o f  s earch the p sycho logical mode l inc ludes t ime 
and money expende d ,  the co st of de laying de c i s ions , and such 
p sycho logical co s t s  as  fru s trat ion and the annoyance of deal ing w i th 
sa l e s  per sonne l .  Obviou s ly , the p sycho logi cal model  pr edict s that 
higher co s t s  l ower external s ear ch .  
Thi s  c o s t -bene f i t  hypo the s i s  i s  imp l i c i t  i n  the work o f  Houl ton 
[ 26 ,  1 96 1 ] ,  Buckl in [ 5 ,  1 96 3 ] , and Wint er [ 7 6 ,  1 9 7 5 ] , and is g iven 
exp l i c it tr eatment in Buckl in [ 6 , 1 96 6 ]  and Swan [ 65 , 1 9 7 2 ] . Bucklin 
surveyed f emal e  heads o f  hou s eho l d ,  gathering informat ion about both 
the number o f  stores  v i s i t e d  per shopping trip and the number o f  
shopping trips  taken p r i o r  t o  pur cha se of a nonf ood i t em worth $ 5  o r  
mor e . He u s e d  t h e  den s i ty o f  retai l e s tab l i shment s  as one proxy for 
s earch co st s ,  comparing the numb er o f  intratrip shopping stop s at  
downt own retail s i t e s  with s t op s at nondownt own s i t e s . In his  samp l e  
the propor t ion of produ c t s  shopped f or twi ce o r  more i n  downt own s i t e s  
was 20 . 7  per cent compared with 1 1 . 8  percent f or nondowntown s i t e s . 
Thi s was interpr e t e d  as support f or the propo s i t ion that higher sear ch 
c o s t s imp ly les s external  search . 
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Swan [ 6 5 ,  1 9 7 2 ]  devi sed  a s imp l e  experiment which included 
measuring the ef fect  o f  search co st s . He asked subj e c t s  t o  j udge the 
quality o f  flashlight bat t er i e s .  The s ubj e c t  who mo st cons i stently 
cho s e  the bat tery with the l onge s t  l if e  won $1 . There were f iv e  phony 
brands from which to p ick . Choice  proceeded s equent ia l l y ,  and af t er 
each cho ice  a report on the l ife  of one bat t ery of the brands cho sen 
was g iven t o  the subj e c t . One group was a l l owed t o  swi t ch bran d s  
cost l e s s ly ,  t h e  o ther group had a f ixed number o f  po int s subtrac t e d  
from their s c or e s  each t ime they swit ched brands . Under t h e  co s t  
tr eatment t h e  mean number o f  brand swi t che s w a s  2 . 6 compared t o  7 . 8 
under the no co s t  tr eatment . 
In a r e lat ed experiment , Lan z e t ta and Kanare f f  [ 33 ,  1 96 2 ]  a l s o  
found that as t h e  direct  c o s t  o f  inf ormat ion incr ea se d ,  t h e  amount o f  
information demanded b y  de c i s ionmaker s  f e l l .  I n  the ir exper iment 
subj e c t s  were pre sented with a ser ie s o f  hypo the t i cal "pro b l ems " and 
asked t o  make d e c i s ions about the i r  so lutions . For examp l e ,  the 
hi s t ory o f  a mental pat ient would be de scribed and several al ternat ive 
treatment s  sugge s t e d . In order to receiv e  a payoff,  the subj ect would 
have to choo se the  "c orre ct " so lut ion from the  offered  al t er nat ive s ,  
e i ther on the ba s i s  o f  the g iv en inf ormation or af ter obtaining up to 
f ive addit ional p i e c e s  of  inf o rmat ion . Two treatment s were used ; in 
the f i r s t  the add i t iona l inf ormat ion was free  and $ . 0 5  was awarded for 
a "corre c t "  answer , in the second each p i e c e  of additional informat ion 
co st $.05 and $ . 30 was awarded f or a "correct " an swer . In fact , there  
wa s no  "corre ct" an swer,  the probab i lity of re c e iving a payoff b e ing 
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pre d e t e rmine d a s  a l inear f unct ion o f  the number o f  addi t ional p i e c e s  
o f  inf ormat ion t h e  subj ect acce s se d ,  ( sp e c i f ical ly ,  t h e  probab i l ity o f
r e c e iving a payoff  g iv en t h e  subj e c t  used  n add i t ional p i e c e s  o f  
inf ormation w a s  . Zn) . Subj e c t s  never u s e d  on average mor e than four 
add i t ional p i e c e s  of inf ormat ion even when it wa s free . However , they 
s y s t emat i cal ly acce s se d  s ign i f ican t ly fewer add i t i onal p i e c e s  of 
inf o rmat ion when it was co s t ly than when it wa s free ( " s ignificant ly" 
here being used in a stat i st i cal sense ) .  
Regarding the gains  from s earch , Katona and Mue l ler [ 3 1 ,  1 95 5 ] , 
Dommermuth [ 1 1 ,  1 96 5 ] , and Buckl in [ 6 ,  1 96 6 ]  a l l  f ound evidence 
cons i s t ent with the pr edict ion o f  the p sycho logical mod e l  that sear ch 
increa s e s  with produ c t  price . Buck l i n ,  f or exampl e ,  reported  that the 
percentage o f  two-p lus-stop s  shopp ing increased  monotonical ly from 3 8 . 8  
percent i n  the $5 t o  $14  category t o  64 . 4  perc ent in the $1 00-p lus 
cat egory [ 6 ,  1 96 6 , p .  26 ] -- s e e  Tab l e  1 . 1 2  A s  po int ed out above , 
r e sul t s  such as Bucklin' s ,  that ext ernal search is po s i t ive ly r e lated 
to product  pr i c e , are  not  pr e d i c t e d  by any exi st ing f ormal c o s t -bene f it 
mode l s . Economi s t s  have noted thi s anomaly [ e . g . ,  66 , Thaler , 1 9 7 7  -­
see  footno t e  1 1 ] but as yet have not r e s o lved i t . 1 3
A r e lat ionship which i s  c l ear ly pre d i c t e d  b y  the economi c s  
l i terature i s  that , other things constant , greater durabil ity imp l i e s  
more s earch . Thi s i s  due to two e ffe c t s . Fir s t ,  greater durab i l i ty 
imp l i e s  that if a poor pur chase i s  made it wil l take l onger to correct 
f or i t  by renewed search f or a d i f f erent (and hopeful ly bet t er ) brand ; 
more car e mus t  be taken to s e l e c t  a good brand ini t ial ly . 1 4  Second , 
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TABLE 1 
EXTENT OF SHOPPING AS A FUNCT ION OF PRODUCT PRICE [ 6 ,  BUCKLIN , 1 96 6 ] *  
$5 $ 1 5  $50  
to $14  to $49 to $9 9 $100+  no data t o tal 
One stop I 6 1 . 2% 5 5 . 4% 46 . 9 %  3 6 .6 %  33  . 3% 56 . 2 % 
( 3 1 4 )  ( 1 28 )  ( 3 0 )  ( 2 1 ) ( 8 )  ( 50 1 )  
Two-p lus st ops I 3 8 . 8 %  44 . 6 %  5 3  . 1 %  64. % 6 6 . 7 %  43 . 8 %  
( 1 9 9 )  ( 1 03 )  ( 3 4 )  ( 3 8 )  ( 1 6 )  ( 3 9 0 )  
*Entries  g ive p er centag e s  wi thin each price  categor y .  Number s in
par enthe s i s  g iv e  total observat ions f or each c e l l .  The no data
column include s o b s e rvat ions for which the p r i c e  category was unknown . 
grea t er durab i l i t y  imp l i e s  l e s s  frequent pur cha s e . Hence s t ored 
information i s  l e s s  u s e ful and mor e externa l  search is  r equired . 
However , there appear s  to be l i t t l e  external s earch a s s o c iated with the 
pur chase of durab l e s . Katona and Mue l ler repo r t e d  such a r e s u l t  over 
30 year s ago [ 3 1 , 1 955 ] . More  r e c ent ly,  Newman and S tae lin in a study 
of prepurchase  inf ormation se eking f or new car s and maj or househ o l d
app l iance s  found that "hal f t h e  buyer s thought main ly o f  o n l y  o n e  brand 
at the out s e t  of the d e c i s ion proce s s . "  Furthermor e ,  " [ n ] early 40% o f  
t h e  buyer s who had n o t  u s e d  t h e  product befor e  f or exampl e ,  al so  
con s idered only one  brand initial ly "  [ 44 ,  1 9 7 7 , p .  2 56 ] . Al though 
r e c ent r e s earch in e conomi c s  has begun to consider rigorous ly the 
que s t ion of "how much information is enough " to keep marke t perf ormance 
wi thin acceptable bounds ( i . e . ,  how many shopper s are needed t o  keep a 
marke t compe t i t iv e  -- see  Wilde and S chwar t z  [ 7 0 ,  1 9 7 9 ] ) ,  current 
j u dgment s  as  t o  whe ther l ev e l s  o f  nonshopp ing by consumer s for maj or 
durab l e s  such as those repo r t e d  by Newman and S tae l in are problema t i c  
r emain subj e c t ive and somewhat impr e s s ioni s t i c. The i s sue i s  c l oude d 
by the argument that internal search ( s e e  S e c t ion 2 )  is heav i ly rel ied 
upon in the pur cha s e  of consumer durab l e s . As  Newman and Stae l in point 
out in the conc lus ion o f  the i r  paper ,  "the f indings do not ne ce s sarily 
mean that the buyer is  i l l-inf ormed . He may have started  with what he 
regarded as  suf f i c i ent knowledg e "  [ 44 ,  1 95 5 , p .  2 56] . 
The i s sue here i s  by no mean s a minor one , and it rai s e s  yet 
ano ther conundrum for economist s . Economic theory t ends t o  ignore 
internal search . Yet the availab l e  evidence sugg e s t s  that int ernal 
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s ear ch i s  a n  important e l ement in the pur cha se o f  consumer durab l e s . 
Thi s  make s intuit ive sense s ince the pur chase of durab l e s  may invo lve 
mor e f or e s ight than the purcha se of nondurabl e s . Hence the inf ormation 
acqu i s i t ion pro ce s s  may take p lace over an ext ended period o f  t ime . 
Ideal ly one woul d  l ike t o  have measur e s  o f  the t o tal amount of s ear ch 
a s s o c iated with a dec i s ion to pur chase a good . But ac curate measure s  
o f  t o tal search ( internal sear ch a t  the t ime the dec i s ion to consider a 
purchase is made , p lu s  any subs e quent externa l  sear ch ) are l ikely t o  be 
har d t o  generate . In parti cular , survey meas ur e s  w i l l  typi cal ly 
under state the actua l  amount of tota l  search to the extent that 
con sumer s absorb inf ormat ion pas s ively in the ear ly stag e s  o f  the 
de c i s ion proce s s  ( or s imply forge t )  and wil l over state it  to the extent 
they want t o  f e e l  l ike they've been wise shopper s and have made 
informed cho i c e s  in po s t-pur chase int erv i ews [ 43 ,  Newman and Lockeman , 
1 9 7 5 ] . While  it has been sugge sted  that measur e s  of the t o tal amount 
of sear ch are ne eded  [ 3 ,  Bettman , 1 97 7 ] , no prac t i cal way s of
generat ing such data have ye t  emerged . 
In s p i t e  of the me thodo logical problems with consumer durab l e s  
studie s ,  the o ther evidence c i t e d  above s trong ly sugg e s t s  that external 
s ear ch is  a funct ion o f  the per ceived co st s and bene f it s  a s s o c iated  
wi th i t . Consumer s may vary in their  ab ility  to  pro c e s s  inf ormation 
[ 67 ,  Tver sky and Kahnaman , 1 97 4 ;  20 , Grether , 1 9 7 7 ] , but mo st do act 
rat ional ly in their r e s ponse to c o s t-be ne f i t  trade-o ff s .  
Evidence respe c t ing the e f f e c t s  o f  education and income on 
ext ernal s ear ch i s  both l imi t e d  and s omewhat conf l i c t ing . For exampl e ,  
C laxt on,  Fry , and Por t i s  [ 8 ,  1 97 4 ]  found that buyer s who used  store 
v i s i t s  as a maj or e lement o f  the i r  sear ch pro c e s s  had the highe s t  
income a n d  e ducation wh ile  Ude l l  [ 6 8 ,  1 96 6 ]  reported t h e  seeming ly 
contradi c t ory r e s u l t  that high income buyers  were mor e  l ike ly to make 
their purchase  dec i s ions prior t o  vi s i t ing st ore s than low income 
buyer s .  Cons i s t ent w ith th i s  last observat ion ,  Ude l l  al so f ound that 
buy er s  with a fam i ly income b e l ow $5 , 000 or above $10 , 000 were least 
l ike ly t o  examine a product  in a s t or e ,  leave the store  without 
pur chas ing , and return later to make the purcha s e . 
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A s imilar nonmonot on i c  re lat ionship be tween income and ext ernal 
search was r e ported by Bruce and Dommermuth [ 4 ,  1 96 0 ] . The se author s 
d iv ided survey r e s pondent s into three c la s se s : lower c la s s  househo lds  
were  define d  as  tho s e  l o cated  in an area wi th cen sus tract mean 
hou s eh o l d  income s vary ing from $2 , 00 9  to $4 , 43 6 , work ing c las s 
hou s eho l d s  were def ine d  as tho s e  located  in an ar ea wi th census tra c t  
mean hous ehold  income s vary ing from $4 , 29 9  to $5 , 941 , and midd le c la s s  
hou s eho l d s  w e r e  def ine d  as  tho s e  l o cated i n  a n  ar ea with census tract  
mean household income s vary ing from $5 , 00 9  to $9 , 0 81 . The  l ea s t  
shopp ing ac t ivity wa s found in the lower c la s s ; 7 0  percent o f  t h e  l ower 
class  r e s pondent s made a pur chase after shopp ing in one store  and 
con s idering one brand . The mo st shopp ing ac t ivity wa s found in the 
working c las s ; only 45 percent made purchase s af ter shopp ing in one 
s t or e  and cons idering one brand . Shopping ac t ivity in the mi ddle  c la s s  
was l e s s  than that i n  t h e  working c las s, but n o t  so l imited a s  in the 
l ower c la s s  ( se e  Tabl e  2 ) . 
TABLE 2 
SHOPPING PATTERNS : PERCENTAGE OF RESPONDENTS WITH GIVEN BRAND / S TORE 
ACTIVITY PATTERNS [ 4 ,  BRUCE AND DOMMERMUTH, 1 96 0 ,  P .  5 ]  
THE SHOPPING MATRIC 
LOWER CLAS S 
( n=l 3 6 )  
S tore s 
Number o f  5 or 
Brands  1 2 3 4 mo re  
5 o r  
mor e  0 1 0 1 0 
4 0 0 1 1 0 
3 1 0 2 0 0 
2 5 8 0 0 0 
1 7 0  1 0 0 0 
THE SHOPPING MATRI X 
WORKING CLAS S 
( n=l 9 1 )  
S t o r e s  
Number o f  5 or 
Bran d s  1 2 3 4 mo r e  
5 o r  
mor e  0 0 0 1 4 
4 1 2 3 2 1 
3 1 2 7 0 0 
2 7 8 2 0 0 
1 45 4 1 0 0 
THE SHOPPING MATRI X 
MI DDLE CLASS  
( n=56 4 )  
Store s 
Number of 5 or 
Bran d s  1 2 3 4 more  
5 or 
mor e  0 0 1 1 2 
4 0 0 2 1 0 
3 3 3 5 1 0 
2 6 6 2 0 0 
1 56 6 1 0 0 
23 24 
S ome evidence sugg e s t s  the r e lat ionship between e ducat ion and 
externa l  sear ch is al so nonmonotoni c . Newman and S tae l in [ 44 ,  1 9 7 2 ]  
found that consume r s  with advanced degr e e s  ( ma s t er s ,  do c t orate s ,  or 
pro f e s s iona l  degr ee s )  repo r t e d  about the same amount of ext erna l  s earch 
as consumer s w i th l e s s  than high s choo l e ducat ions . Consume r s  w i th 
intermediate amounts of educat ion repo r t e d  sub s t ant ial ly mor e  ext ernal 
s ear c h .  O f  cour s e  mo st survey s o f  consumer b ehavior do not control for 
income when repor ting the e f f e c t s  o f  education or for educa t ion when 
reporting the e f fe c t s  o f  income . S ince income and educat ion ar e l ike ly 
to be corr e lat e d ,  it is not surpr i s ing the evi dence sugge s t s  s imilar 
r e l a t ionships wi th external s earch . 
5 .  SATIS FACTORY SEARCH AND THE CHOICE PROCES S 
In addi t ion t o  the direct  co s t s  and bene f i t s  di s cu s se d  in 
S e c t ion 4,  a number o f  o ther fact or s  have an indirect inf luence on th e 
dire c t ion and int ens i ty of external sear ch .  The s e  include the 
avai labi l i ty o f  inf ormation,  t ime pr e s sur e ,  and the d i f f icul ty o f  the 
cho i c e  task [ 3 ,  Be t tman , 1 9 7 7 ] . The f i r s t  two of the se po se no s p e c ial 
prob l ems ; the avai lab i l ity o f  informat ion can be related t o  s earch 
co s t s  while  t ime pr e s sure can be incorporated  into the sear ch 
strat e g i e s  used by consumer s .  For examp l e ,  a modif ied sequent ial 
s ear ch rul e would require se t t ing a r e serva t ion price  and a t ime l imit 
for search . The consumer wou l d  then search sequen t ial ly unt i l  a pr ice 
which is  l e s s  than the re serva t ion price i s  o b s e rved or the s p e c i f ie d  
amount of t ime i s  exhaust e d ,  i n  wh ich case  the good wou l d  be pur chased 
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at the l owe st observed pric e . 
The r emaining factor i s  mor e pro b l ema t i c . In a marke t s e t t ing 
the " d i fficul ty of the cho ice  task" is d ir e c t ly r e l a t e d  to the 
comp l exity of the product . That i s ,  if the product is chara c t e r i z e d  by 
a number of a t t r ibut e s ,  and if  the se a t tribut e s  are cost ly to eva lua t e  
( in some appropriate  sense ) , then t h e  choice  t a s k  (eval ua t ing brands 
and s e l e c ting an a c c e p table  one ) is mor e d i f f i c u l t  than the cho i c e  task 
a s s o c ia t e d  with a homogeneous produc t . Thu s , the mor e d i f f icult  the 
cho i c e  task,  the more co s t ly i t  i s  ( by definition )  to s e l e c t  the b e s t  
from any g iv en s e t  of  a l t e rnativ e s . Thi s  sugge s t s  t h a t  with in a 
mul t ia t tribute choi c e  environment a con s umer i s  l ike ly to s e t t l e  for 
l e s s  than the bes t  a l terna t iv e ,  s ince even i f  direct search co st s are 
l ow ,  evaluation co s t s  may not be . S e t t l ing for  l e s s  than the be st i s  
genera l ly referred t o  a s  "sat i s f ic ing" whi l e  holding out f or the be s t  
i s  c a l l e d  "opt imiz ing . nl5 
Thi s  sect ion exp l or e s  the r e l a t i onship between sa t i s f  icing and 
opt imiz ing ( a s  def ine d  above ) and ext erna l  sear ch. Consumer
r e s e archers predict a po s i t iv e  r e l a t ionship between a "concern f or 
o p t ima l i t y "  and the degree of ext erna l  sear ch [ 3 ,  B e t tman , 1 9 7 7 , p .  2 8 ] . 
This i s  ba sed  on the a s sumpt ion that a consumer concerne d w ith 
o p t ima l i ty w i l l  s e l e c t  a search s trategy whi c h  y i e l d s  a large number of
observat ions ( a  large number of observations being ne ces sary to f ind 
the be st a l t erna t ive ) .  In o ther word s ,  the imp l i c i t  a s sumpt ion is tha t  
t h e  consumer f ir s t  decides  whe ther t o  opt imiz e  o r  n o t  a n d  t h e n  decides  
how t o  search . But , how t o  search and  whe ther t o  o p t imize are  two 
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a s pe c t s  of the s ame de c i s ion ; an observed po s i t ive r e l a t ionship between 
externa l search and a concern f or opt ima l ity s imp ly ref l e c t s  the mor e 
f undament a l  l ink between s earch and evalua t ion co s t s  and the degree of 
ext erna l  search . 
Thi s  argument i s  obvious in cho ice  environment s in which there  
i s  no  co s t  or uncertainty a s so c ia t e d  wi th determining the  value of any 
part i cular a l terna t iv e  once that a l t erna t iv e  has been "obse rved . "  If 
the consumer f a c e s  high informa t ion acqu i s i t ion co s t s  in the s e l e c t ion 
o f  a l t erna t iv e s  f or considera t ion,  then the search strat egy i s  l ikely
t o  be s a t i s f a c t ory wi th r e s p e c t  t o  the value o f  the a l t erna t iv e  
se l e c t e d ,  b u t  i t  may st i l l  be opt ima l w i t h  respect  t o  t h e  ne t exp e c t e d  
v a l u e  o f  sear c h .  
To s e e  t h e  d i st inc t ion between opt imiz ing and sa t i s f ic ing when 
the co s t  of o b serving a l t erna t ive s is po s i t ive but the c o s t  of 
inspect ing a l terna t iv e s  ( t o  a s se s s  the ir "ut i l ity" ) once they hav e  been 
s e l e c te d  f or cons idera t ion is  zero,  con s i der the f ixed sampl e  s iz e  rule 
[ 60 ,  S t i g l er , 1 96 1 ]  ver sus the se quent i a l  rul e [ 36 ,  McCa l l ,  1 96 5 ] as  
d e s cribed in S e c t ion 2 o f  this paper . Nei ther r equire s  the consumer to 
hold out f or the very best a l t erna t iv e  of those  ava i l abl e ,  but the 
s equent ial rule minimiz e s  the ne t expe c te d  co st of  pur cha se ( f ina l 
pur cha s e  price  minu s co s t s o f  search ) . Thus the latter is opt ima l 
g iven the c o s t s  of observing a l t erna t ive s ,  but both are s a t i sfact ory 
with respect  t o  actua l  cho i c e s . 
A mor e int erest ing case  ari se s when i t  i s  a l so cost ly for the 
con sumer to determine the value o f  a l t erna t ives  ( goods ) . Tha t  i s ,  l e t  
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goods be described by mul t i p l e  at tribute s w i th the consumer s '  having 
under ly ing ut i l ity  funct ions def ine d over the s e  attr ibut e s . But as sume 
that consumer s cannot co s tle s s ly o b s e rve ind ividual attr ibut e s .  Then , 
f o l low ing Wr ight , two ne c e s sary e l emen t s  of any cho ice  mode l  can be 
ident i f i e d ,  "a pro c e s s  by which s ing l e  mul t iat tribute opt ions ar e 
evaluated and a rul e by which one opt ion i s  d i s c r iminated  from the 
o ther s "  [ 7 7 ,  1 97 5 , p .  6 0 ] . The two e l ement s are cal l e d  the "data
combinat ion proce s s "  and the "choi c e  rule . "  
Data combinat ion proce s se s  are c las s i f ie d  as c ompensat ory or 
noncompen satory . Compen satory proce s se s  " p i cture a person averag ing ( o r  
adding )  data s o  that po sit ive and negat ive data hav e  a balanc ing 
impact , " while noncompensatory proce s se s  "as sume a consumer combine s 
data such that the pre sence (absence ) of one attribu t e  may not 
compen sate at al l f or the absence ( p r e sence ) of o ther s "  [ 7 7 ,  1 9 7 5 , 
pp . 60-6 1 ] . S tandar d examp l e s  of noncomp en sat ory proce s se s  are w e l l­
known l exicograph ic rul e ,  and the conj unct iv e  and d i s j unct iv e  rul e s  
[ 13 ,  Einhor n ,  1 9 7 1 ] .  The lexi cographic rule r equir e s  f i r s t  that the 
attr ibut e s  be or dered a ccor ding to r e lative impor tance . Then a l l  
opt ions are compared on the s ing l e  mo st impor tant d imens ion . I f  the
consumer cannot d i sc r iminate among the options on the bas i s  o f  the 
f i r s t  d imension,  then a se cond is compar e d ,  e t c .  C l ear ly thi s rule  
requir e s  that a l l  opt ions be compared on at l east one d imen s ion . With 
conj unc t ive and di s j unc t ive rul e s ,  the consumer define s  minimum cutoff  
( re s e rvation )  lev e l s  f or each attribu t e . The conjunct iv e  rul e requires  
the consumer t o  r e j e c t  options with any bel ow-cut off at tr ibute s  and the 
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d i s j unc t ive rul e  r equir e s  the consumer to accept  opt ions wi th any 
above-cuto f f  attr ibut e s . Unl ike the l exi cograph i c  rul e ,  the se rul e s  do 
not ne c e s sar i ly r equire all  opt ions be inspe c te d .  In fac t ,  a number o f  
cho i c e  rul e s  b e s i d e s  a "choo se t h e  be s t "  can be combine d  with them . 
For exampl e ,  the consumer could s e l e c t  a f ixed number of options t o  
inspe ct ,  app ly a conj un c t iv e  rul e to inspect each , and then se l e c t  a t  
random from tho s e  which pas s  the t e s t . Alternat iv e l y ,  t h e  consumer 
cou l d  use a sequent ia l strategy , app ly ing a conj un c t iv e  rule to inspect 
each opt ion and choo s ing the f i r s t  o p t ion which i s  acceptable . 
Within a mul t iattr ibu t e  cho i c e  environment ,  the data 
combi na t i on pro c e s s  and the choi c e  rule are c lo s e ly r e la ted . Assume 
th e  consumer at t empt s t o  maximiz e ne t bene f i t s  from purchas ing the 
goo d . He or she will  con sider  the co s t s  o f  sear c h ,  and o f  evaluat ing 
al t e rnat iv e  goods , once they are observ e d ,  and wil l then choo s e  a 
s trategy f or s ear ch and for making a f i nal cho i c e . If the cho i c e  rul e 
i s  t o  sat i sf ice , th i s  i s  be caus e  the consumer has high co st s o f  
o b s e rving opt ions , or o f  evaluat ing s pe c ific option s ,  or both , in
re lat i on to the expect ed gain s  from purchase . I f  the cho ice  rule 
exhibi t s  a concern f or opt imiz ing , thi s r e f l e c t s  a differ ent out c ome of 
the co s t-bene f i t  calculat ion . But the same co s t s  and bene f i t s  
s imul taneous ly e f f e c t  external search . It  i s  not surpr i s ing , 
therefor e ,  that the observed degree of ext ernal s earch is po s i t iv e l y  
r e lated  t o  a "concern" w i th t h e  o p t imal i ty o f  f inal cho i c e s .  
Swan [ 64 ,  1969] d e s igne d an experiment t o  t e s t  th i s  pr edict ion . 
It con s i sted of a s e r i e s  of choice s ituation s ,  each expo s ing subj e c t s  
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t o  f our phony brands o f  shirt s .  Color slide s were shown o f  the shirt s ,  
f our shir t s  per slide . Four ratings o f  the overall quality o f  each 
shirt  were available ( "good , " "ac c e p table , "  or "poor " )  at a co s t  of 
$ . 0 1  per rat ing . With all 16 rat ings a subj e c t  could ident ify the 
corr e c t  alt ernat iv e  w i th cer taint y .  
Each subj ect  was g iv en a budg e t  o f  $ . 2 0 p e r  tr ial . I f  a 
corre ct  alterna t iv e  was sele c t e d ,  the subj e c t  was allowed to keep that 
por t i on of the budg e t  not spent on inf ormation. In the "opt imal 
cho i c e "  tr eatment , the subj e c t  had t o  ident i fy the one brand w i th the 
b e s t  set o f  rat ings t o  r e c e iv e  the payof f  ( i . e. ,  correct choi c e s  
yielde d t h e  r e s i dual budg e t ,  incorr e c t  cho i c e s  had value z e r o ) . In the 
" sat i s factory cho i c e "  treatment ident ify ing e i ther of the two b e s t  
brands was acceptable . 
Swan ' s re sults  clearly conf irm the pr e d i c t ion that information 
seeking i s  lower wi th sa t i s factory choi c e  as c ompare d  t o  opt imal 
cho ice ; the mean number o f  rat ings purchase d was 6 . 6 3  under opt imal 
cho i c e  as compare d  t o  4 .44 under sat i s fact ory cho i c e . 
Claxton , Fry , and Por t i s  al so  f ound support for the hypo the s i s  
that external sear ch i s  po s i t ively related t o  a conc ern wi th opt imality 
in their survey ; "nonthor ough " buyer s were the least  concerne d about 
pur chasing the "right 11 product [ 8 ,  1 97 4 ,  pp . 3 9 , 41 ] .  
Of cour se , if choice pro ce s s e s  deriv e  from mor e fundamental 
co s t-benefit  calculat ions then the parame t e r s  of par t i c ular cho i c e  
pro c e s s e s  ( cutoff levels ,  order o f  inspe c t i on o f  attribut e s ,  e t c . )  
should not be taken as  g iven . A s  Wr ight has put i t ,  "consumer s are 
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s en s i t iv e  to s impli fying and o p t imiz ing d i f f er ences  be tween the [ choice ] 
strate g ie s ,  and could engage in covert 'co st-bene f i t '  analy s i s  when 
s ele c t ing a decis ionmaking pro c e dure " [ 7 7 ,  1 9 7 5 , p .  6 0 ] . G iven thi s  
observat ion,  it  i s  clear that r e s ear che r s  should focus o n  the link 
between s ear ch co s t s  and choice  proce s se s . More ov e r ,  the economi s t s '  
co st-benef it paradigm i s  likely t o  be very use ful i n  th i s  ef fort . 1 6
Recent theor e t i cal [ 74 ,  Wilde , 1 9 8 2 ]  and exp e r imental [ 21 ,  Gr e ther and 
Wilde , 1 983 ]  work has begun to explor e the s e  i s sue s . The se two papers  
focus  on the  conj un c t ive cho i c e  strate g y .  Wilde develop s a the or e t i cal 
framework in which the conj un c t iv e  choice  rule can be analy z e d . 
Spe c if i cally, h i s  analy si s  i s  concerned wi th the pro c e s s  by whi ch 
consume r s  u s ing a conj un c t iv e  cho ice  rule det ermine the minimum cut o f f  
levels for each at tribute . He f i r st charac t e r i z e s  the "opt imal" cut o f f 
levels u s ing a model bas e d  on exp e c t e d  utility maximation in wh ich 
inf o rmation acqui s i t ion co s t s  appear expli c i t ly .  I n  part i cular , he 
as sume s each attr ibu t e  o f  the mult i-attr ibu t e  good sought by the 
consumer has an a t t ribu t e-s pe c i f i c  insp e c t ion co s t . The consumer' s 
problem i s  to select a se t of cut o f f  lev els , one f or each attr ibut e ,  
whi ch maximize  expe c t e d  ut ili ty net o f  inspe c t ion co st s .  The s olution 
to th i s  problem involves a rather complicate d  s e t  of  "first-order­
con d i t ions . "  The s e  are d e r ived by d i f f erent iat ing (mathema t i cally 
speaking ) the expe c t e d  utility funct ion of the consumer with respect  t o  
the various cut off levels , o n e  f or each a t t r ibute  o f  the good . Wh ile 
the mathema t i c s  are tediou s ,  the re sul t ing s e t  of equations which 
def ine the opt imal cut off levels ( and hence the opt imal conj unc t ive 
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s trategy) have a nat ural "expe c t e d  benef i t  equal s expected co s t "  
int erpr e tat ion . The probl em i s  that they are s t i l l qui t e  compl icate d .  
Ye t the conj unctive r u l e  i s  general ly regar ded as  a good candida t e  as a 
s impl ify ing strategy . In fact , a number o f  consumer r e s earcher s have 
sugge s t e d  that conj unc t ive stra t e g i e s  ar e c ommo n ly u s e d  by 
de c i s i onmaker s as ini t ial scr eening dev i c e s  in s i tuations  wher e  they 
ar e contra sted  by a large number of  cho i c e s  [ 3 ,  B e t tman ,  1 97 9 , p. 2 1 5  
and t h e  r e f erenc e s  c i t e d  therein s e e  a l s o  2 1 , Grether and Wilde , 
1 9 83 ] . 1 7  Thi s view sugge s t s  that consumer s who u s e  the conj unc t iv e
r u l e  may not actua l ly s e t  t h e  cut o f f  lev e l s  in a n  "opt ima l "  fashion 
( that i s ,  they may use a conj unc t iv e  rul e ,  but not set  the cut o f f  
lev e l s  in a way cons i s t ent with t h e  "expe c t e d  ut i l ity ne t of  
inf ormat ion acqui s i t ion co s t s "  mo de l ) . The  que s t ion then ari se s ,  how 
do they set  the cut o f f  l ev e l s? 
One way to approa ch th i s  que s t ion without altogether for saking 
the e conomi c approach de s cribed above is to  pr e se rve the exp e c t e d  
bene f it s  equa l s  exp e c t e d  cost s interpretation o f  t h e  so-ca l l e d  opt imal 
so lut ion but s imp l i fy the cal culations  involved in s o lving tho s e  
equat ions b y  throwing o u t  o r  ignoring certain kinds o f  information . 
For examp l e , if ther e are n a t t ribut e s ,  then the f ir s t-order-condit ions 
involve n " s imul taneous " equations which ne e d  t o  be j o int ly so lved to 
de t ermine the n cut o f f  l eve l s ,  one f or each attribu t e . I t  turns out 
that there i s  a natural way to ignor e th i s  s imul tane i ty and tr eat each 
cut o f f  l evel  as though it were independent of the o ther n- 1 cutoff  
l eve l s . Simil arly , there is a natural way to  ignor e the fact  that the 
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order i n  which at tribu t e s  are inspe c t e d  mat t e r s  ( if all  a t t ribut e s  were 
equa l ly co st ly to  observ e , the consumer shoul d  be mor e choosy  on ear ly 
a t t ri but e s  than lat er o ne s  s ince rej e c t ing a good on the bas i s  o f  an 
at tr ibu t e  which i s  inspe c t e d  late in the proc e s s  mean s that th e 
consumer has t o  s tart a l l  over again w i th the f ir s t  at tribute -- o ther 
things equa l , it  is better  t o  be mor e d i s c r iminat ing on attr ibut e s  
ins pe c t e d  ear ly i n  the proce s s  than tho s e  inspe c t e d  lat e  i n  the 
pro ce s s ) . Thi s e f fect  is r e f erred to as se quent ial ity . Ignor ing these  
var ious kinds  o f  intera c t ions yields  a set  of  "nono p t imal "  conj unc t iv e  
rul e s . They al l have t h e  same f orm as t h e  opt imal conj un c t iv e  rul e but 
the cut o f f  lev e l s  on the at tribut e s  are d i f f er ent . Mor e over , the 
cuto f f  l ev e l s  re spond d i f f er ent ly to change s  in attr ibu t e- spe c i f i c  
inspe c t ion c o s t s  depending on whe ther consume r s  u s e  the opt imal 
conj un c t iv e  strategy or one of the nonopt imal conj un c t iv e  strateg i e s . 
Thi s provid e s  the bas i s  f or an emp i r i cal t e s t  o f  wh ich conj unc t iv e  
s trategy de c i s i onmaker s  actua l ly use . Grether and Wilde ( 21 ,  1 9 83 ]  
repor t s  on j u s t  such a t e s t ,  u s ing laborat ory experiment s .  
The exper iment s run by Grether and W il de were des igne d in such 
a way that subj e c t s  were f or c e d  to  use conj unc t ive s trateg ies in 
s e l e c t ing i t ems from s ome se t of  al terna t iv e s . Alt erna t iv e s  were 
d e s c r ibed s imp ly by some v e c t or o f  number s .  For examp l e ,  a thr e e  
attr ibu t e  alterna t iv e  might be a se t of three number s (x 1 , x 2 , x3 ) where
each number xi was drawn from s ome d i s tribution f i ( xi ) defined o n
[ xf,x� ] . Subj e c t s  w e r e  inf ormed o f  t h e  distr ibut ion fi and i t s  range 
( in the s e  experiments f i was alway s uniform on s ome interval cxr , x� ] ) .
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Each attribute  had an at tribute s pe c i f i c  inspe c t ion cost  c i . Ut ili ty
fun c t ions were linear ; that is ,  if  the  f inal choice  of a subj ect  was 
( x1 , x2, x3 ) ,  the gro s s  pay o f f  ( in dollar s ) was x1 + x2 + x3• Ne t 
payoffs were equal t o  the gro s s  payof f minu s any inspe ct ion co s t s 
incurred in obtaining i t . The probl em fac ing the subj e c t s  was s imp l e ,  
p i c k  a s e t  o f  cuto f f  leve l s ,  one for each attr ibut e ,  giv en that f inal 
cho i c e s  would be d e t e rmined by random draw s  f or each a t t ribut e ,  u s ing 
the conj unct iv e  rule -- i . e . ,  an alterna t iv e  would be acceptable only 
if it exceeded the cut o f f  level sele c t e d  by the subj e c t  on each 
at tr ibu t e . The tr eatment variable in the exp e r imen t s  was inspe ct ion 
co s t s ; holding ut ili ty funct ions and the di s tributions o f  attribut e s  
constant , ins pect ion c o s t s  were var i e d  in such a way as t o  be able t o  
t e s t  whe ther subj e c t s  conf orme d t o  the opt imal conj un c t ive rule o r  one 
of the nonopt imal conj un c t iv e  rule s . 
The re sults  o f  th i s  exper iment were rather surpr i s ing . I t  
turned out that subj e c t s  did  n o t  conf orm t o  the opt imal conj unc t ive 
rul e .  In fact , in two t e s t s  each of four relat iv ely d i f ferent subj e c t  
population s ,  all conformed t o  t h e  nono pt imal conj unc t ive rule in whi ch 
both s imul tane i ty and sequent iality were ignore d .  What th i s  meant in 
t e rm s  of the r e s ponse to change s  in inspe c t ion co s t s  is that an 
inc r ease in the cost  of inspect ing a t tr ibu t e  i lower e d  the cut o f f  lev e l  
on that attribut e ,  b u t  had n o  e f f e c t  on the cut off l evels of o ther 
attribu t e s  ( in the aggregate ) .  Put in economi c  j argon , "own-e f f e c t s "  
r e sponded a s  i n  the opt imal rul e ,  but "cro s s-eff e ct s "  were zero . Thu s  
subj e c t s  p i cked up o n  t h e  "fi r st-orde r "  expect e d  bene f i t-exp e c t ed c o s t  
trade-o f f s  r e s ult ing from change s  in inspe c t ion co st s ,  but in the 
aggregate  they ignor e d  the " s e cond-order "  trade-o f f s  which g e t  
incor pora t e d  int o t h e  opt imal conj unc t ive s trategy . 
6 .  INFORMATION OVERLOAD 
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Consumer r e s earche r s ,  and lately po l icymaker s ,  have been 
concerned w i th how much inf ormat ion a consumer nee ds t o  make 
intelligent cho i c e s  in product marke t s . In part i cular , s ince consumer s  
can o n ly proc e s s  a limi t e d  amount o f  inf orma t ion in a g iven t ime 
per i o d ,  the pot ent ial danger of "informat ion overload" has at tract ed  a 
great deal of att ention r e c ently . For example , many of the r e cent 
deba t e s  over r ev i s ing the Truth in Lending Act ,  as well as tho s e  
concerning new d i s clo sure legi slat ion,  have relied heav ily on thi s 
not ion .  Information overloa d ,  at least as u s e d  by consumer 
r e s ear cher s ,  generally s e ems to r e f er to the propo s i t ion that exce s s  
inf ormation may b e  dy s funct ional . Thi s  i s  a much stronger statement 
than saying that more informa t ion may not be be t t e r .  It sugge s t s  that 
too much informat ion can lead t o  confused , irrat ional cho ice behav ior . 
The pur po se o f  thi s s e c t ion i s  t o  r eview the evidence advanced t o  
support  t h e  exi st ence o f  such a phenomenon . 
A r e c ent serie s of stud i e s  conduc t ed by Jacoby and his  
as s o c ia t e s  [ 27 ,  1 9 7 4 ;  28 , 1 97 4 ;  29 , 1 97 5] concluded that de c i s ionmake r s  
d i s p lay the great e st ac curacy in their cho i c e s  when "moderate " amount s  
of information are avai labl e .  Whi l e  the s e  stud i e s  prov ide the pr imary 
sour c e  of support ing evidence f or proponent s of the overload 
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hypo the s i s ,  they have been extens ive ly c ri t i c iz e d  ( 7 5 ,  W ilkie , 1 9 7 4 ;  
63 , Summer s ,  1 97 4 ;  50 , Rus so , 1 97 4] .  In fact , in r eanaly z ing t h e  data 
generate d in the Ja coby experiment s ,  S taelin and Payne [ 5 9 , 1 97 6 ]  
conclude that mor e inf ormation may well be a s s o c iated with mor e 
accuracy in choi c e ,  not le s s . 
The experimental des ign was bas i cally the same in all of the 
Jacoby experiment s .  Fir s t  each subj e c t  was asked t o  indi cate  the 
impor tance of each attr ibu t e  a s s o c ia t e d  w i th the product being u s e d  (a 
"weighting fac t or " ) , and t o  s pe c i fy an " ideal" brand . The s e were used 
t o  prov ide a base against which accuracy o f  cho i c e s  could be measur ed . 
Next , each subj e c t  was g iven x brands  to choo s e  from, each brand 
de scr ibed by y attr ibut e s . The obj e c t iv e  was to evaluat e  the 
inf ormation provided and choo se the "be s t "  brand in the set . The b e s t  
brand was def ined a s  t h e  brand least di stant from t h e  ideal brand , 
where d i s tanc e  wa s measur e d  linearly us ing the a t tribu t e  weights 
eli c i t e d  at the out s e t  of the experiment . Acro s s  the three 
exp e r iment s ,  x ( the number o f  brands ) range d  from 4 t o  1 6 , and y ( the 
number o f  at t r i bu t e s  about which information was provide d )  range d  from 
2 t o  6 .  Us ing x . y  as a measure of the t o tal informat ion available , and 
plott ing the number of correct  cho i c e s  against i t , the exper iment er s 
concluded that "providing sub s tant ial amount s of package information 
can r e s ul t  in poor er purchase de c i s ion" ( 27 ,  1 9 7 4 ,  p .  40] and that 
increas ing the inf ormat ion load tends to produce  "dy s func t i o nal 
consequen c e s  in  terms o f  the consumer ' s  abil ity to p i ck the brand which 
was b e s t  for him" ( 28 ,  197 4 ,  p .  6 ] . 
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The raw data from the f i r s t  o f  the s e  exp e r iment s i s  g iven in 
Table 3 ( 27 ,  1 97 4 ,  p .  6 5 ] .  Casual inspe ct ion o f  Table 3 is rather 
inter e s t ing in light o f  the claims of Jacoby , et al . Fir s t ,  ignoring 
chanc e  ( the fact that random de c i s ions are le s s  likely t o  y ield a 
"be s t "  choice  as the number of brands  increa s e s ) , it appear s that , 
holding the number of brands constant , mor e "inf ormat ion" per brand i s  
"be t ter"  when the number of bran d s  i s  4 o r  8 and i s  "neutral "  when the 
number of brands is 1 2 . S imilarly , ignor ing chanc e ,  it appear s that , 
holding "informat ion" per brand con stant , mor e brands to choo se from i s  
"bet t e r " f or two i t ems per bran d ,  "neutral" f or four items per brand , 
and "wor s e "  f or s ix i t ems per brand . I t  i s  rather har d to conclude 
from th i s  int erpr e tat ion o f  the  data that mor e inf ormation i s  bad and 
i t ' s rather ambiguous  whe ther eve n  more ch o i c e  is bad : So  how d i d  the 
exper iment er s reach the i r  conclu s ions? Con s ider measur ing t o tal 
"informat ion load " by .multiply ing i t ems / brand t ime the number o f  
brand s . Plot t ing the number o f  correct cho i c e s  against th i s  var iable 
g ive s Figure 1 .  The inverted u- shaped curve in Figure 1 is the sour c e  
o f  t h e  rather strong conclus ions o f  Jacoby e t  al . Plo t t ing t h e  number
o f  "corre c t "  cho i c e s  again s t  the  t o tal number of "bit s "  o f  inf ormation
prov ided subj ect s ,  sugge s t s  that as the lat ter  r i se s ,  perf ormance s 
increa s e s  init ially , but eventually it peaks and f or increase s in the 
"amount "  of information provided beyond that , perf ormance falls ! 
Taking the bas i c  exper imental des ign as g iven ( thi s ,  by i t self , 
requir ing a great leap of fai th ) , the tran s i t i on from Table 3 to F igur e 
1 ,  a ne c e s sary mov e to be able to conclude that incr ea s ing inf ormat ion 
TABLE 3 
NUMBER OF SUBJ ECTS ( OUT OF 17 IN EACH CELL) CORRECTLY 
CHOO S I NG THEIR "BEST " BRAND 
Numb er of 
brands 4 8 1 2  
Number o f  
i t ems / brand 
rev eal ed 
2 2 3 5 
4 6 6 5 
6 1 1  8 4 
Total 1 9  1 7  14 
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l oa d  t ends t o  produ c e  dy s f unc t io nal consequence s ,  r equire s  two imp l i c i t  
a s s umpt ions . F i r s t , it must be the case  that choi c e  accuracy can b e  
c ompare d acro s s  the c e l l s  o f  Tab l e  3 w i th d i f f erent number s of  brand s  
t h e  fact that accuracy shoul d  fal l pure l y  as  a matter  of  chance a s  the 
number of bran d s  increa se s mu st not ma t t e r . S e cond , there i s  a one-t o­
one trade-of f  between brands and a t tr ibu t e s  -- it is only the t o tal 
number of  "bit s "  o f  inf ormation confront ing the consumer tha t ma t t e r s  
a s  f a r  a s  cho i c e  accuracy i s  concerne d .  The s e  two as sumptions  a r e  
rather probl ema t i c ,  and ,  in fac t ,  they provide t h e  ba s i s  f or the 
c r i t ique s o f  the Jacoby e t  a l  exper iment s men t i oned abov e . Stael in and 
Payne [ 5 9 ,  1 9 7 6 ]  repre sent the mo st s o phi s t i ca t e d  of the s e . 
S t a e l in and Payne take the ba s i c  de s ign o f  the Jacoby , e t  al . 
expe r iment s a s  g iven . They avoi d  the f i r s t  of the two a s sumpt ions 
ne eded t o  yield Figure 1 by adj u s t ing Tab l e  3 for random cho i c e s .  That 
i s ,  they measure perf ormance by comparing the a c tual number of c orre c t  
cho i c e s  to tho s e  bas e d  on chance a l one f or each ce l l .  They then 
perform a s imp l e  regre s s ion ana ly s i s  in which a dj u s t e d  a c cura cy is the 
dependent var iab l e  and the independent variab l e s  are the product c la s s  
( one for each of t h e  Jacoby, e t  al experiment s  -- thr ee  in total ) , the 
number of brands, and the number o f  attr ibut e s  per brand . They 
conclude that 
• • • as mor e information i s  provided the accuracy incr ea s e s
marked ly u p  t o  and inc luding s ix p i e c e s o f  informa t ion . However , 
when the consumer i s  g iv en eigh t  p i e c e s  o f  inf ormation per 
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a l t ernat iv e ,  there s e ems t o  be a sharp decrea se in a c cura c y ,  a f t e r  
which mor e informa t i on s e ems t o  improve t h e  consumer s  ac curacy • •
it s e ems tha t more informa t ion i s  a s so c ia t e d  w i th mor e accuracy at 
l e a s t  w i th in sma l l  rang e s  [ 5 9 , p .  1 89 ] . 
Since  Jacoby and h i s  a s so c ia t e s  a l s o  found that their subj e c t s  f e l t  
mor e  s a t i s f ie d  a n d  l e s s  conf u s e d  w ith more inf orma tion,  a s  r ev e a l e d  i n  
a po s t-experiment que s t ionnair e ,  the over a l l  conc lus ion one i s  l e d  t o  
draw from t h e  proj ect  ( b a s e d  on S t a e l in a n d  Payne ) is  tha t  incr eas ing 
consumer inf ormation is a good i dea whenever i t  i s  f easib l e . Thi s 
conc lus ion i s  po lar to that drawn by the or igina l  researcher s ,  yet it 
never thel e s s  appear s t o  be ine s capabl e .  
Perhaps  i t  i s  not s o  ine scapa b l e  though . After al l ,  i t  i s  
s t i l l  based o n  the pr e s umption that the ba s i c  exp e r imental de s ign o f  
t h e  Jacoby e t  a l  exper iment s was val id . Given the manner in wh ich 
performance wa s mea s ured ( di stance from an " i deal " brand u s ing 
subj e c t iv e  weight s f or attr ibut e s ) ,  there remains  s ome uncertainty as 
to whe ther the s o-ca l l e d  informa t ion overload phenomenon is r eal or not . 
B e f or e  cont inu ing , and in l ight of the above d i s cu s s ion,  it 
w i l l  be u s eful t o  re treat momentar i ly and d i s c u s s  br i e f ly the 
background of the "informat ion overload" hypo the s i s .  The original 
not ion o f  inf ormation ove r l oad , due to p sycho log i st s ,  wa s r e lated  to 
inf ormat ion acqu i s i t ion ( in par t i cu lar , ext ernal search ) , not the 
qua l i ty of f i nal choi c e s .  A s  B e t tman suunnar iz e s  the l i t eratur e ,  
" s everal resear cher s hav e  argu e d  that a s  task d i f f i cu l ty ( measured a s  
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the t o tal amount o f  information,  or inf ormation load ) increa se s ,  there 
will f i r s t  be inc r ease s in search , but then eventually decreas e s  as  too 
high an inf ormation load is impo sed" [ 3 , 1 97 9 , p .  1 26 ) . Studie s in the 
psychology l i teratur e which suppo r t  th i s  conclu s ion inc lude S ieber and 
Lanz e th [ 57 ,  1 96 4 ) , S treufer t ,  Sve d f e l d  and Dr iver [ 6 2 ,  1 96 5 ]  and 
S chrode r ,  Driv e r ,  S treufert [ 54 ,  1 96 7 ) . Inf ormation over l oad in  th i s  
cas e  refers  t o  t h e  fac t  that inf orma t ion acqui s i t ion ( i . e . ,  external 
s ear ch ) eventua l ly decrease s as the t o tal amount of inf ormation 
available  to the de c i s ionmaker pas se s  s ome c r i t i cal lev e l .  Of cour s e ;  
th i s  doe s n o t  imply performance fal l s  as inf ormation load increase s .  
In fact , quit e  the oppo s i t e  i s  likely t o  o c c ur . 
Cons ider the fol lowing s cenario . Suppo se that a d e c i s i onmaker 
ha s to choo se an alt ernat ive from some set  o f  mul t i-at tribute i t ems . 
Suppo se further that the de c i s ionmake r  only fee l s  strongly about one or 
two attribut e s . Now a random s ample o f ,  say , two a t t ribut e s  i s  not 
l ike ly to provide informat ion about these crucial at tribut e s . Hence 
the d e c i s ionmaker w ill be f or c e d  t o  u t i l iz e  inf ormat ion on bo th 
available at tribu t e s  in order to make a cho i ce. A random sampl e  of , 
say , four attribute s w i l l  o c cas ional ly include o ne or bo th of the 
crucial attribut e s . When th i s  is the ca se , the de c i sionmaker can base 
a d e c i s ion on the s e  and nee d not u t ilize  the inf ormat ion availab l e  on 
the other two attribu t e s . When i t  i s  not the cas e , however , the 
de c i s ionmaker might again be f or c e d  t o  ut i l iz e  informa t ion on all  four 
avai lab l e  attribu t e s  in order to make a cho ice . The larger i s  the 
sampl e  of attribut e s ,  the mor e l ike ly i t  i s  that the cruc ial a t t ribut e s  
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are include d .  Thu s ,  o n  averag e ,  as  the s e t  of availabl e  attribut e s  
increase s ,  w e  would exp e c t  t h e  number utilized in making de c i s ions t o  
increase init ially , eventual ly p eak, and thereaf ter  fall , B u t  the 
qua l i ty o f  cho i c e s  shoul d  increase monotonical ly over the ent ire range . 
The scenario j u st d e s c r ibed seems t o  be con s i stent w i th the 
observat ions o f  p sy cholog i st s  s tudy ing informat ion load , a l though it
should  be not e d  that their experiment s were d e s igned to focus  on 
informa t i on acqu i s i tion,  not perf ormance , The probl em with the way 
Jacoby and his  a s so c iat e s  int erpr e t  the re sult s of their experiment s  i s  
that they seem t o  have as sumed that the inver t e d  u-shaped curve wh ich 
de s cribe s the rela t ionship b e tween inf orma t ion l oad and external s ear ch 
holds  also f or the re lationship between inf ormation load and 
perf ormance . Adj u s t ing Table 3 f or chan c e  y i e l d s  Tab l e  4 and Figure 2 .  
One can int erpr e t  Figure 2 as an inve r t e d  u- shaped curve but i t  i s  j u s t  
as plau s ib l e  t o  argue that i t  i s  ri s ing o n  the range [ 0 , 24 ]  and rough ly 
constant after that . Mor eover , as Tab l e  4 indicate s ,  the only t ime 
subj e c t s  did s ignif i cantly wor s e  than random behavior wou l d  have 
pr e d i c t e d  is  in the l ow information tr eatment s .  
In any ca s e ,  i t  i s  c l ear that further re search i s  nee ded on the 
inf ormation over l oad i s sue . Thi s  research shoul d  dist ingu i sh be tween 
inf ormat ion acqu i s i t ion and perf ormance and i t  shoul d  at t empt to 
ident ify rel evant measur e s  o f  inf ormation l oad -- it i s  not obv ious 
that t o tal "bit s "  o f  inf orma t i on ( number of brands t ime s i t ems per 
brand ) is  very meaningful . 
TABLE 4 
NUMB ER OF CORRECT CHOICES OUT OF 17 MINU S THE EXPECTED 
NUMBER GIVEN RANDOM CHOICE 
Number of brands 4 8 1 2  
Random cho ice 4 . 2 5 2 . 1 25 1 . 06 
Number of 2 -2 . 25 . 87 5  3 . 94 
items /brand 4 1 . 7 5 3 . 87 5 3 . 94 
r eveal ed 6 6 . 7 5  5 . 87 5  2 . 93 
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F I GURE 2 
ADJUSTED PERFORMANCE AS A FUNCT I ON OF INFORMAT ION L OAD 
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A recent set o f  experiment s by Gr e ther and Wilde [ 22 ,  1 9 8 2 ]  
began to  explore  some o f  the s e  i s sue s . The init ial purpo s e  of the s e  
exp e r iment s wa s to  explore  the extent to  which "bit s "  mea sure cogni t iv e  
l oad , u sing a n  exper imental des ign that was free  of  many of  t h e  
prob l ems whi ch marr e d  t h e  Jacoby,  e t  al . ,  exper iment s ,  Their  r e s ul t s  
sugg e s t  that ind iv i dua l s  are quit e  g o o d  a t  making certain types o f  
rather compl icated  cho i c e s . Moreover , wh i l e  the de s ig n  inc luded tasks 
which c l early var ied i n  comp l exity , the degr e e  of  d i f f iculty or 
"cogni t ive l oad" was not we l l  d e s c r ibed by s imp ly count ing the number 
o f  b i t s  of  informat ion available . In fac t ,  sub j e c t s  in the s e
exp e r iment s a c t e d  as  i f  they were q u i t e  capab l e  o f  ignoring irrel evant 
informat ion . 
The part of the Grether and W i lde exper imen t s  mo s t  germane t o  
t h e  d i s c u s s ion h e r e  invo lved cho i c e s  over s e t s of  c ompound l o t t e r ie s . 
For examp l e ,  Figur e 3 d i s p lays a prob l em in wnich ther e  are two i t ems 
to choo s e  from ( A  or  B ) , each d e s c r ibed  by three  binary l o t t e r ie s .  I f  
a subj e c t  cho s e  A ,  than his  or h e r  r eward would be based  on t h e  sum o f  
t h e  out come s o f  t h e  thr e e  s imp l e  l o t t er i e s ,  each determined b y  a 
separate random draw from a b ingo cage containing bal l s  numbered 1 -1 0 0 . 
In the f ir st s imp l e  l o t t ery , the sub j e c t  would earn $7 . 6 0  if 1 -35 was 
drawn and $3 . 7 0  if 36- 1 0 0  was drawn, in the second he or she would l o s e  
$ . 45 i f  1 -25 was drawn and earn $ . 1 0  i f  26-1 00  was drawn , in t h e  third 
a draw of 1 -6 0  wou l d  have earned the subj e c t  $4 . 5 0  wh ile  6 1 -1 0 0  would 
have paid $7 . 7 5 , Hence i f  t h e  s equence o f  draw s  were 27 , 4,  a n d  5 0 , 
the subj ect  woul d  earn $7 . 6 0  + ( - $ .45 ) + $4 .5 0 ,  or $ 1 1 . 6 5 . 
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FIGURE 3 
EXAMPLE OF CHOICE TASK IN GRETHER-WILDE EXPERIMENTS 
Pro spect 1 Pro spect 2 Pro spect 3 
$7 . 6 0  if 1 -35 -$ . 45 if 1 -2 5  $4 . 50 i f  1 -6 0  
I t em A $3 . 7 0  if 36 -1 0 0  $ . 1 0 i f  26-1 0 0  $ 7  . 7 5 i f  6 1 -1 0 0  
$ . 30 i f  1 -7 5  $8 . 0 0  if 1 -40 $3. 5 0  if 1 -6 5  
I t em B -$ . 2 5  if 7 6 -1 0 0 $5 . 0 0  i f  4 1 -1 0 0  $ 7  . 40 i f  6 6 - 1 0 0  
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Cho i c e  tasks varied in s iz e  from 2 i t ems each cons i s t ing o f  2 
s imp l e  l o t t e r i e s  up to 5 i t ems each cons i s t ing o f  5 s imp l e  l o t t e r ie s . 
Be s id e s  varying a c cording to the number o f  i t ems and the number o f  
s imp l e  l o t t e r i e s ,  cho ice  ta sks varied a c cord ing t o  how many o f  the 
s imp l e  l o t t e r i e s  "ma t t ered . "  For examp l e ,  in Figure 3 ,  each i t em 
inc lude s one s imp l e  l o t t ery which invo lve s very low payo f f s  compared t o  
t h e  other two . Thus a n  " informe d"  cho i c e  f o r  t h i s  t a s k  would r equire 
the subj e c t  to cons ider only two of the thr e e  s imp l e  l o t t e r i e s  making 
up each i t em .  The number of such "cruc i a l "  s imp l e  l o t t e r ie s in a 
cho i c e  task i s  ca l led the " d i f f iculty"  of the t a sk . Fina l ly ,  correct 
cho i c e s  were def ined us ing the dominanc e  c r i t e r i on .  I n  o ther wor d s , 
for each cho i c e  task there exi s t e d  a unique i t em which domina ted a l l  
o ther i t ems i n  the sen s e  that i t  p l a c e d  higher probab i l i ty o n  high
payo f f s  than any o ther i t em .  For examp l e , in F igur e 3 ,  a compound 
gamb l e  cons i st ing o f  A . l  and A . 2  i s  equ ivalent t o  one cons i s t ing o f  B . l 
and B . 3 . But B . 2  domina t e s  A . 3  so that i t em B domina t e s  i t em A .  Tabl e  5 
pr e sent s the percent o f  correct  re spon s e s  by t a sk s iz e  and d i f f icul ty . 
Looking down any column in Tab l e  5 ,  it i s  c lear that wha t ever 
determine d the degree of d i f f iculty o f  a task , i t  wa s not the t o t a l  
number of b i t s  of informat ion ava i lable  a l one . Fur thermor e ,  two o ther 
r e s u l t s  emerged from the se exper iment s which should be useful in 
prov i ding some direct ion for futur e r e s e arch in th i s  area . F i r s t , the 
Tab l e  sugg e s t s  tha t the mo st important factor wa s the number of 
"cruc i a l "  s imp l e  l o t t e r i e s , S e cond , i t  a l s o  sugg e s t s  that subj e c t s  
were g enera l ly qu i t e  capab l e  o f  ignor ing irre l evant informa t i on .  I n  
TABLE 5 
PERCENT CORRECT RES PONSES 
Number o f  I t em s / Number of S imp l e  Lot t er i e s  
D i f f icul ty* 2/ 2 2 / 3  3 / 3  4/ 4 5 / 5  
1 . 8 1  . 80 . 6 4  . 5 8  . 5 8  
2 . 5 8  . 7 4  . 6 2  
3 . 5 8  . 3 9  
4 . 2 8  
*Dif f iculty refers  t o  the number o f  "cruc ial "  s imp l e  l o t t e r i e s  i n  a 
choi c e  ta sk . 
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o n ly two of the e l even t a sks d i d  the perc entage o f  corre c t  cho i c e s  f a l l
b e l ow approxima t e ly 6 0  percen t , one w i t h  9 component l o t t e r i e s  and one 
with 16 component l o t t e r ie s . B ehavior approached random only when the 
degr e e  of d i f f iculty ( the number of cruc ial  s imp l e  l o t terie s )  and the 
number o f  a l t erna t iv e s  increased  s imu l taneou s l y .  
7 .  CONCLUS ION 
One theme of this survey has been tha t we can go a l ong way 
t oward under stand ing consumer behavior under imperfect  informa t ion by 
us ing var ia t ions on the economi s t ' s  c o s t -bene f it mode l .  Examp l e s  of 
this  approach include the ba s i c  homogeneous goods mod e l s  o f  S t ig l er 
and McCa l l ( d i s c u s sed  in S e c t ion 3 ) , ext ens ions to he t erogenous goods 
b y  Nel son and Wil de ( di s cu s se d  in S e c t ion 4 ) , and Wilde ' s  forma l mod e l  
o f  conj uct ive cho i c e  ( d i s c u s s e d  in S e c t ion 5 ) . Whi l e  t h e  evidence
r eviewed provides  some support for this po s i t i on ,  it  also r a i s e s  s ome 
que s t ions . Regarding the former , it  s e ems c lear that consumers 
genera l ly r e s pond as pre d i c t e d  to change s  in the per c e ived benef i t s  and 
co s t s  of  search . Regard ing the l a t t e r ,  the r e  are two s t y l i z e d  fac t s  
wh ich s e em incon s i s t ent with the pr e d i c t ions o f  the exi s t ing s earch 
mo de l s . First , there  appears to be a po s i t iv e  r e l a t ionship between 
ext erna l s earch and product p r i c e . S e cond , consumer s  appear t o  engage 
in r e l a t iv e ly l i t t l e  shopping for dur able s .  Whe ther a pur ely economic 
mo d e l  can exp l a in the s e  anoma l i e s  is an open que st ion . 
The survey a l so d i s c u s s e d  two a r e a s  in wh ich much mor e  r e s e a rch 
is nee ded,  s a t i s factory s ear ch and informa t ion ove r l oad . The maj or 
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pro b l em w i th the f o rmer i s  tha t i t  lacks a uni fy ing the or e t i c a l  
f ounda t i on .  I t  i s  h e r e  that t h e  co st-bene f i t  paradigm coul d  turn out 
t o  be extreme ly u s e fu l .  An i l l u s trat ion of how thi s  might be done wa s 
d i s c u s s e d  br i e f ly in Sect ion 5 .  Wilde ' s  mode l of conj un c t iv e  choi c e  
[ 74 ,  1 9 82] wa s out l i ne d  there a n d  a serie s of  experiment s  r e l a t e d  t o  i t  
summa r i z e d  [ 21 ,  Grether and W il de , 1 9 83 ] .  Whil e  the approa ch worked 
we l l  f or the conj unc t iv e  rul e ,  a u seful re search effort  would be t o  try 
apply ing it to other choi ce-mode l s .  
Mor e work i s  a l so ne eded o n  inf orma t ion over loa d .  The consumer 
r e search l i t erature r e l a t e d  t o  inf orma t ion over l oa d  i s  smal l  but i t  ha s 
had a large impa ct  -- many po l icymake r s  are concerne d about informa t ion 
ove r l oa d  and there s e ems t o  be a general b e l i e f  tha t the phenomenon ha s 
been w e l l-do cument e d .  Yet  Sect ion 6 showed that there i s  a great deal 
o f  confus ion on thi s i s sue and tha t no real evi dence exi st s whi ch l inks
incr e a s e s  in informa t ion load to decrea se s in performance .  Thi s  is an 
unf ortuna te  state o f  affair s ,  but hopeful ly one tha t will be corr e c t e d  
in futur e  r e search . 
FOOTNOTES 
1 .  Dire c t  compar i son shopping is t o be contr a s t e d  with " s e quent ia l "  
shopping rule s .  The d i f f er ence b e tween the two i s  d i s cu s sed in 
Sect ion 2 be l ow .  See  a l so Wilde  [ 6 9 ,  1 97 7 ]  and e spe c ia l ly W i l de 
and Schwar t z  [ 7 0 ,  1 9 7 9 ]  for a more c omp l e t e  d i scus s ion of the s e  
po int s . 
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2 .  For a br i e f  d i s c u s s ion o f  inf orma tion  and the l abor marke t s e e  
R e e s  [ 47 ,  1 96 6 ]  or S t ig l er [ 60 ,  1 96 2 ] . A more det a il e d  ana ly s i s  
i s  provided b y  Yav i t z , e t  a l . [ 7 8 ,  1 97 3 ] . 
3 .  For a further d i s cu s s ion o f  impe rfe c t  informa t ion and market 
s tructure see Roth schild' s survey [ 48 ,  1 97 3 ] . See  a l so 
S a t t er thwaite [ 5 2 ,  1 97 7 ]  and Schmalensee [ 53 ,  1 97 7 ]  f or addit ional 
spe c i f ic examp l e s , 
4 .  For a compr ehens ive crit ique of s t ud i e s  ba s e d  on survey data s e e  
Newman a n d  Lockeman [ 43 ,  1 97 6 ] . 
5 .  In addition,  the r e  i s  a w e l l-known po s i t iv e  externa l ity a s so c i a t e d  
wi th shopping a c t ivity : an incr ea s e  in a n y  ind ividual consumer' s 
search e f f or t s  re sul t s  in a b e t t er d i s t r ibut ion of pr i c e s  for 
everyone e l s e . S ince thi s s o c i a l  r e t urn is no t ful ly appropriabl e  
b y  the indiv idua l , there may be a resul tant underinv e stment in 
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search [ 40 ,  Ro th s c h il d ,  1 97 3 ; p .  1 28 9 ] . S e e  Wilde [ 6 9 , 1 97 7 ]  f o r  
a forma l demonstration o f  th i s  ext erna l ity i n  t h e  labor marke t .  
6 .  Informa t io n  i s  " suff i c ient " i f  the expe c t e d  marg i nal gain ( in 
u t i l i ty ) from the a cqui s i t i on o f  add i t i ona l informa tion  i s  l e s s  
than the marg inal co s t . Opera t io na l ly thi s s imp ly means the 
consumer can opt ima l ly ba se a de c i s ion on s t or e d  informa t ion . For 
examp l e ,  if  conf l i c t ing informa t ion such as d i s para t e  repor t s  on 
durab i l ity is pr esent , inf orma t ion in memory may st i l l  be 
"suff i c i ent " if the value o f  a more pre c i se e s t ima te  o f  dura b i l i ty 
i s  not wor th i t s  c o s t . 
7 .  S t i g l er , in fact , a cknow l e dg e d  the opt ima l ity of a sequent ial  rule 
[ 6 0 ,  1 96 1 , p.  21 9 ] . He also devo ted s ome a t tent ion t o  the sour c e s  
o f  d i sper s ion [ 60 ,  1 96 1 ,  pp . 2 1 9-20 ] , but never construct ed  a 
f o rma l marke t mode l .  
8 .  The opt ima l ity o f  pur e ly sequent ia l search rul e s  i s  a l so sen s i t iv e  
t o  a s sumptions regar d ing t h e  na ture of s e a r c h  co s t s  a n d  the t iming 
o f  observa t ions . See , f or exampl e ,  Benhabib and Bul l [ 2 , 1 9 82 ] , 
Ga l ,  Landsberger and Levykson [ 16 ,  1 9 8 1 ] or Morgan [ 3 9 , 1 9 8 2 ] . 
9 .  P i t z ' paper con s i de r s  several rules  inc luding a se quent ial  one . 
Related work by P i t z  i s  r eferenced in S l ov i c  and Lichten s t e in [ 58 ,  
1 96 8 ] . 
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1 0 . Nel son never exp l o i t e d  ful ly the d i s t in c t ion between search goods 
and exper i ence goods in any f orma l way . For such an ana ly s i s  s e e  
W i l d e  [ 7 1 ,  1 9 8 1 ]  a n d  H e y  and McKenna [ 24 ,  1 9 81 ] . The imp l i ca t ions 
of the d i s t inc t ion f or adv er t i s ing are exp l or ed in S chma l en s e e
[ 53 ,  1 92 8 ] . F o r  a general d i s cu s s io n  of a l l  the se mod e l s  s e e  
Wilde [ 7 2 ,  1 980 ] . 
1 1 . See Tha l er [ 66 ,  1 97 7 ]  for fur ther d i scus s ion of the s e  resul t s . 
1 2 . Buck l in s urveyed 5 06 f ema l e  hea d s  of hou s ehold  in the area o f  
Oakl and , Ca l i f ornia i n  the f a l l o f  1 96 2 .  Number s  in parenth e s i s  i n  
Tab l e  1 g ive number o f  r e s pondent s in each category.  
1 3 . Thi s apparent empirical  regu l ar i ty remains as  one o f  the pr imary 
cha l l enge s  t o  the e conomic approach to consumer informa t ion 
a cqui s i t i on .  Tha l er [ 66 ,  1 9 7 7 ]  sugge s t s  an ana l ogy to the Weber-
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sequent ial rules  ( see  text , supra note 1 1 ) . 
1 4 .  Thi s e f f e c t  i s  derived  f orma l ly in Wilde [ 7 1 ,  1 97 7 ] . 
1 5 . In their c l a s s i c  d i s cu s s ion o f  o p t ima l versus sat i s fa c t ory 
strategie s ,  Mar ch and S imon def ine an a l t erna t iv e  a s  "opt ima l if : 
( 1 )  there exi s t s  a s e t  of c r i t e r ia tha t permit s  a l l  al terna t iv e s  
t o  be c ompa r e d ,  a n d  ( 2 )  t h e  a l t erna t iv e  in que s t ion i s  pr eferre d ,  
b y  the se c r i t e r ia , t o  a l l  o ther a l t er na t ive s .  An a l t erna t ive i s  
s a t i s fa c tory i f : ( 1 )  there exi st s a s e t  of c r i t er ia that 
d e s cribe s minima l ly sa t i s f a c t ory a l t erna t ive s ,  and ( 2 )  the 
a l terna t iv e  in que s t ion mee t s  or exc e eds  a l l  these criteria"  [ 3 5 ,  
1 958 , P •  1 40 ] . 
1 6 . There  ha s been very l i t t l e  f orma l ( i . e . , theor e t i c a l )  ana ly s i s  o f  
t h i s  pro b l em.  Shugan [ 5 5 ,  1 9 80 ;  56 , 1 9 8 1 ] a n d  John son [ 3 0 , 1 97 9 ]  
prov ide ini t i a l  a t ta cks on i t  f rom a consumer rese arch 
Fedner law of p sycho-phy s i c s  in whi ch the " j u st not i ceable per s pe c t ive,  but much work r emain s t o  be done . 
d i f f erence in any s t imulus i s  propor t iona l t o  the s t imulu s . "  Thi s  
i s  an  intriguing po s s ib i l i t y ,  the importance o f  which i s  unknown 
at th i s  t ime . S t i g l er [ 6 0 ,  1 96 1 ] , it shou l d  be not e d ,  d i d  pr edict  
tha t grea t e r  expend iture imp l ie s more external search . However , 
he related  th i s  to changes  in the frequency of pur cha se , not pr ice  
change s .  Pure  shif t s  in the  d i s tribution of p r i c e s  shou l d  have n o  
e f fect  on  externa l  search , e i ther with f ixe d samp l e  size  rul e s  or  
1 7 . For  a c r i t ique o f  th i s  l it eratur e  se e Lynch ( 34 ,  1 9 81 ] . 
1 8 . Wilde ( 7 5 ,  1 97 4 ]  a l s o  rai sed the f i r s t  obj e c t ion and Rus so ( 50 ,  
1 97 4 ]  sugg e s t e d  both factor s cast  doubt on the conc lus ions of 
Jacoby , e t  a l . 
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